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ABSTRACT
While Japan marked its success in surpassing the U.S. to dominate the semiconductor
industry in 1986, the Chinese semiconductor industry transformed from a small sector into a
global competitor. This thesis tracks and compares the developmental histories of this
industry between China and Japan and analyzes the differences in government policy,
economic systems, comparative advantage and trade policy in both countries, in order to
ascertain the two countries’ industrial development strategies and governments’ impacts on
the semiconductor industry.
This analysis finds that Japan’s development strategy targeted a knowledge- and capitalintensive industry (semiconductor industry, in this case) by providing preferential assistances
while deliberately keeping that market protected from foreign competitions to ensure that the
industry had a high volume and a profitable base. When the Japanese achieved the economy
of scale and cost competitiveness and gained enough production experiences, Japan expanded
the market share by aggressive pricing and ultimately dominated the foreign market. On the
other hand, China’s development strategy went from a protectionist strategy in a command
economy—learning from the Japanese model—which focused on cultivating large stateowned enterprises to be national champions and protecting the market from foreign
competition, to an export-oriented strategy in a relatively more market-oriented economy
which encouraged foreign investment and leveraged China’s labor-abundant comparative
advantage by cooperating with foreign firms.
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I Introduction

I.1 Overview Introduction
China has been regarded as the most important emerging economy in the world. Since
2010, China ranks as the world’s second largest economy after the U.S. It has been the
world’s fastest-growing economy, with consistent growth rates of around 10% over the past
30 years. Among China’s major industries, China’s electronics information industry has
grown three times faster than the national GDP growth rate and has grown faster than the
machinery manufacturing and metallurgy industries (People Daily). However, the value
added ratio (amount of value added/total sales * 100%) of the electronics industry in China is
only 23.4%, compared with the whole national average of 27.1% (Economic Operation
Report of China Electronic Information Industry 2007). The main reason is that China’s role
in the global electronics industry remains an assembly base, which relies on overseas
electronic components and parts. Up until now, China still bears the impression of “copycat”
and “made in China”.
On the other hand, with a high concentration of electronics companies, dominant global
market share in electronics, and high quality of its products, China’s neighbor Japan has a
good reputation for its technologies in the electronics industry. Japanese electronics
manufacturers are well known for producing a wide variety of product lines, including
televisions, mobile phone handsets and personal computers, which are under the category of
consumer electronics. Nowadays, Japan is the largest consumer electronics manufacturer in
the world. In contrast to China, which bears the impressions of “low quality” and “low tech”,
Japanese companies are famous for high quality and innovation, having introduced products
such as the Sony Walkman and VHS recorder.
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In response to this phenomenon, a question comes up: why does China have a growing
electronics industry but with low value-added while Japan on the other hand attains a large
market share in the industry with high value-added? In order to compare and analyze the
differences in the development strategies between China and Japan, a core sector in the
electronics

industry—the

semiconductor

industry—is

picked

in

this

study.

The

semiconductor industry is a representative example of the general electronics industry, and it
plays an important role in supporting the electronics industry. These tiny microchips perform
the vital functions of arithmetic calculations and information storage and retrieval, which
constitute the “brain” of computers and other industrial and consumer products. During the
financial crisis, it is the strong sales of semiconductors that has been keeping Japan’s growing
exports and offsetting the declining sales in the consumer electronics market. For this reason,
the semiconductor industry is chosen to represent the general electronics industry in this
study.
Japan had the successful experience of developing its semiconductor industry and
managed to leapfrog over the U.S. to take over the dominant global market position in 1986,
32 years after Japan’s market entry. The growth of the Japanese semiconductor production
had been phenomenal. The overall production volume had increased between 1971 and 1992
at an annual average rate of more than 18%. Integrated circuits accounted for a major share
with 23% annual growth (Semiconductor Yearbook 1985-1993). Japanese manufacturers
took industry leadership between 1986 and 1992, controlling 38% to 46% of the world's
semiconductor market (Cho et al 1998). Figure 1.1 shows the changing market share of the
US and Japan in the world's semiconductor shipments.
It is interesting to note that, however, in these days, Chinese firms, who are beginning
to approach Japanese quality at much lower price, are increasingly outperforming Japanese
firms. China already has the world’s third-largest domestic semiconductor market, closely
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following the United States and Japan. According to Table 1.1, U.S. imports from China
surpassed imports from Japan in 2002 and continued to rise over the next years. As a
latecomer in the semiconductor industry, Chinese semiconductor companies succeeded to
grow tremendously in the global sector.
Figure 1.1 Changing Market Share Changes in the World’s Semiconductor Shipments:
United States and Japan, 1982-1992

Source: Nikkei Tsushin
When looking at Chinese and Japanese development history of the semiconductor
industry, there are some similarities such as their pirating of the design from foreign
products, their protectionist trade policies and industrial projects. A series of questions
further occurred to me: is Chinese path of developing the semiconductor industry different
from Japanese path? How did two countries’ governments contribute to the industrial
development and were these policies effective? What are the similarities and differences in
the government policies that Chinese and Japanese governments implemented? What are the
factors that led to China and Japan’s current status in the global semiconductor market? Are
Chinese and Japanese industrial development strategies coherent with the economic theories?
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Table 1.1 US electronics and information industry trade with China and Japan, 1997-

2005
Source: USITC Dataweb 2006
Note semiconductors account for a significant share of electronics and information industry
trade
As I have found no previous text about the comparison between Chinese and Japanese
development history in the semiconductor industry, I hope to answer these questions by
referring to China and Japan’s development histories and analyzing the economic histories by
applying economic concepts and theories. In this paper, I will focus on the economic analysis
of the semiconductor industry. I will track and compare the development histories in the
semiconductor industry between China and Japan and analyze the economic factors.
My project will be organized in the following fashion. In the rest of the first chapter, I
will give a brief introduction to the development history of the overall semiconductor
industry, state my literature review and describe the current status of China and Japan’s
semiconductor industry development. In the second chapter, I will track back to China and
Japan’s development histories in the semiconductor industry. In the third chapter, I will
compare the two countries’ industrial development strategies from an economic perspective.
The comparison of the development histories will be divided into a couple of sections, all of
which I believe contribute largely to the different paths of the development in the two
countries, including comparative advantage, economic and political system, government
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policy, international trade and foreign investment. In the fourth chapter, I will conclude my
study and provide answers to the questions I raised in the beginning of this study.

I.2 Literature Review
Longtime observers of the Chinese semiconductor industry, notably Dennis Simon,
started to track the development of this sector in the mid-1980s (Simon, 1987; 1992; 1996;
Simon and Rehn 1988; Naughton, 1999). Most of the studies during this time emphasized the
role of the state had played in industrial planning while a few researchers gave attention to
regions and companies. Increasing interest was attracted to the industry when it experienced
rapid growth around the 2000 (Chen and Toyama 2006; Chesbrough 2005; Chesbrough and
Liang 2008; Dewey-Ballantine 2003; Fuller 2005; Klaus 2003; Lin 2009; PWC 2004; Wu
and Loy 2004; Yuan 2001). Since the Chinese state had a record of intervening in industries,
the scholarly research emphasized an analysis of industrial restructuring and policies of
liberalization at the country level (Chesbrough and Liang 2008; Klaus 2003; Lin 2009; Wu
and Loy 2004; Yuan 2000).
Among these scholars, Li (2011) described the transformation of the Chinese
semiconductor industry from a small sector into an international competitor as a spectacular
episode of China’s economic success. Li (2011) documented the developmental history of the
Chinese semiconductor history from its stagnant state-dominated eras (prior to 2000) to a
more successful stage led by innovative business enterprises (after 2000). Li (2011) found
that the success of the industry came from the transformation of investment strategies and
organizational structures of businesses and governments. It involved the transfer of strategic
control from the state to techno-entrepreneurs and managers, the adoption of new
organizational structures to support the needs for investment (Ibid).
On the other hand, there are many literatures written about the factors leading to
Japanese success in the semiconductor industry. (Anderson 1980; Abegglen 1973; Bylinsky
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1981) Due to Japan’s aggressive pricing strategy in the global semiconductor market and
Japan’s surpass over the U.S. in the 1980s, many researchers in the U.S. pointed to Japan’s
government’s effects on the semiconductor industry (Cupertino 1983; Hay 2012; Okimoto et
al 1984). Within these literatures, Cupertino (1983) asserted that the Japanese semiconductor
industry was mainly affected by its government targeting. While the report is highly
polemical, it shows that the Japanese semiconductor industry has received and continues to
receive various forms of assistance from its government. Okimoto et al (1984) analyzed the
strengths and weaknesses of Japanese semiconductor with reference to the role of
government and policies.

I.3 A Brief Intro to Semiconductor Industry Development
The semiconductor industry is an extremely dynamic sector. For over fifty years, this
industry has been generating innovative semiconductor chips of increasing power (higher
quality) and decreasing prices (lower cost) at an astonishing pace according to Moore’s Law1.
The application of semiconductor chips in a wide range of areas has contributed enormously
to economic development by boosting productivity growth and delivering consumer welfare.
But the rapid technological advances in the semiconductor industry are not exogenous
shocks; rather, they are the result of heavy R&D spending and organizational learning (Li
2011).
The rapid advance of technology and the distinctive features of semiconductor
production have resulted in massive R&D expenditures and high fixed costs for the industry.
The costs of building a leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing facility, a wafer
fabrication plant (or a fab), continue to increase. A state-of-the-art 300mm (12-inch) fab costs
$3 billion to $4 billion to build, while a 200mm (8-inch) fab of earlier generation technology
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  Gordon Moore, one founder of Intel, predicted that in mass production, the number of transistors that can be placed
on an integrated circuit would double every two years, resulting in higher performance and lower costs. See Moore,
1965	
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costs $1.6 billion (Ibid). Developing and deploying process technology is increasingly costly
as well. Developing 90-nanometer logic process technology costs approximately $300
million, while the costs of developing 45-nanometer technology rose sharply to $600 million
by 2006 (MGI 2007).
Prior to the 1980s, the semiconductor industry was vertically integrated. Semiconductor
companies owned and operated their own silicon wafer fabrication facilities and developed
their own process technology for manufacturing their chips. These companies are also in
charge of the assembly and testing of their chips, the fabrication. Thus these types of
semiconductor companies, which design, manufacture and sell integrated circuit products are
usually called integrated device manufacturer (IDM).
To help maintain full utilization of the increasingly expensive fabs, IDMs began to
offer manufacturing services to design houses in the 1980s, making it possible for chip design
to be separated. Since Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) invented
the pure-play business model, the semiconductor industry has become a segment of
increasingly vertical specialization. According to the pure-play business models, two types of
new start-up firms arose: fabless and foundry. Fabless (fabrication-less) semiconductor
companies specialize in the design and sale of semiconductor chips while outsourcing the
fabrication (fab) of the devices to specialized manufacturers called semiconductor foundry.
Foundries are typically located in countries with lower cost labor so that fables companies
can benefit from lower capital costs while concentrating their research and development
resources on the end market.
Foundries have gained bigger and bigger shares of chip production, as they have been
able to exploit a larger economy of scale than most IDMs. Except for a few of the largest
integrated players such as Intel and Samsung, semiconductor companies nowadays are giving
up their foundry operation, outsourcing chip manufacturing to pure- play foundries in Eastern
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Asia, particularly Taiwan, Singapore and China. The Americans, however, did not enter the
pure-play foundry segment until the establishment of enter the pure-play foundry segment
until the establishment of GlobalFoundries in 2009, a spin-off of microprocessor maker AMD
(Ibid).

I.4 Current status of China and Japan’s Semiconductor Industry
In this section, I will discuss the current status of China and Japan’s Semiconductor
Industry so that we can see the current results of the long-term strategies of the two countries.
I.4.1

China’s Current Status in the Semiconductor Industry
China’s semiconductor production growth since 2000 has been substantial. With a

booming electronics industry, the semiconductor industry has developed rapidly in China.
The Chinese government has been aiming to further develop its semiconductor industry
through information and the sector was identified as a key industry for development in the
11th Five-Year Plan. In 2007, sales revenue of China’s semiconductor market reached RMB
562.4 billion, growing by 18.6% from the previous year (China Knowledge).
However, China’s current production in the semiconductor industry accounts for only a
small percentage of the worldwide market. According to Table 1.2, the proportion of China’s
semiconductor sales value to semiconductor worldwide market sales value is 17.7% in 2003,
19.6% in 2004 and 21.7% in 2005.
Table 1.2 The Proportion of China’s Semiconductor Sales Value to Semiconductor
Worldwide Market Sales Value 2003-2005
2003
2004
2005
Percentage

17.7

19.6

21.7

Source: CSIA and CCID, Compiling Committee, Development Status of Semiconductor
Industry in China, May 2005
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Figure 1.2 Worldwide Semiconductor Market by Region in 2004
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Source: Pecht 2007
China’s rapid growth in the semiconductor industry is largely accredited to its foundry,
an integral part of the semiconductor chip manufacturing industry. Foundries in China have
been recording an exponential growth with the introduction of the Semiconductor
Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC 2004) and Grace in 2001. In 2009, among
the world’s largest fifteen semiconductor foundries in terms of revenue, four companies are
now Chinese (Li 2011). Driven by the outsourcing strategies of the US firms, the global
semiconductor industry had become increasingly segmented into two subsectors, the fabless
industry and the foundry industry. Measured in the share of world production and level of
technological sophistication, the Chinese presence in the world foundry sector has become
significant. According to statistics from PWC, China manufactured approximately 8.7
percent of chips in the world in 2008, and the share is expected to grow to more than 10
percent within a few years (PWC 2010). The leading Chinese firm, SMIC, is able to
manufacture chips only one generation behind the products of leading US and Japanese
firms, meaning the technological gap is ten to twelve months instead of the five to seven
years gap that existed in the 1990s (SMIC Annual Report, 2009).
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Figure 1.3 Percentages of China’s Sectors in the Semiconductor Industry in 2005
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Source: ChinaIRN.com
However, China’s technological advance in the semiconductor industry is still below
the global level. Global semiconductor companies usually attribute to China components on
value chains that tend to be more labor-intensive. China’s development in the semiconductor
industry is still concentrated mainly on low-tech, labor intensive and low-value-added
sectors. According to Figure 1.2, in 2005, China’s ratio among IC design, manufacturing and
package testing is 18.5%, 30.7% and 50.8% respectively. The usual ratio is 3:4:3. But China
is lagging behind in the IC design sector while majorly focusing on the packaging design
sector. This shows China’s role in the global semiconductor industry is an intermediate
processing role with low profit and added value. The major reasons behind are China’s low
technological development, lack of high-tech core wafer, key equipment, which is
inaccessible due to other countries’ limitations. Moreover, China does not have as many
IDMs as advanced countries such as Japan, leading to separation of design, manufacturing
and implementation.
I.4.2

Japan’s Current Status in the Semiconductor Industry
Japan took over several critical areas of the market in the 1980s and today is the leading

supplier of several key pieces of equipment, including lithography machines that miniaturize
circuitry design and use light waves to transfer them onto silicon wafers.
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According to Hays (2012), in the 1980s the Japanese dominated the global computer
chip industry, surpassing American companies. Japanese companies produced 51 percent of
the world’s semiconductors and the three top chipmakers—NEC, Toshiba and Hitachi—were
Japanese. Today, Japanese global market share (28 percent) is about half of what it used to be
and Japanese companies is being outperformed by American as well as South Korean,
Taiwanese and even Chinese companies (Hays 2012). In 2006 Intel and Samsung had a
combined share of the market that was as large as Japan’s 20 largest chipmakers (Ibid). After
sharply falling off in 2008 and 2009, the semiconductor industry picked up in 2010 both in
terms of volume and prices, driven by strong demand for cell phones, computers and other
electronic devices, with total sales of semiconductors expected to top $310 billion for the
year. (Ibid) Moreover, Japan’s disastrous earthquake further shakes Japan’s leadership in the
semiconductor industry in 2011.
Nevertheless, Japan’s success in surpassing the United States is hard to be omitted. But
Japan’s falling in the 2000s also cast a new aspect on my project – to compare China and
Japan’s difference in development history of the semiconductor industry and learn from both
the success and failure experience.
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II An Overall Development history of the Electronics
Industry in China and Japan
II.1 Introduction to the History of China’s Development in the Sector
With a booming electronics industry, the semiconductor industry has developed rapidly
in China. According to the China Semiconductor Industry Association (CSIA), in 2000-2004,
the industry grew with a CAGR of 31% from $2.2 billion to $6.7 billion. The Chinese
government ‘s aim to further develop the semiconductor industry through informationization
was identified as a key industry for development in the recent industrial plan.
However, not long ago, at the end of the 1990s, China’s domestic semiconductor
industry was insignificant internationally by any standard of measurement. China imported
more than 80 percent of the chips from the foreign market (Li 2011). Foreign-made chips
dominated the middle- to high-end of the Chinese market. Throughout the 1990s, the need to
create a Chinese semiconductor infrastructure led the Chinese government to invest billions
of dollars in state-led projects in the hope of building competitive Chinese chipmakers. Two
most well-known state-led industrial project, State Project 908 and State Project 909, allowed
the government to purchase expensive equipment from abroad, sent engineers and
technicians abroad to get training, and actively leveraged access to the enormous Chinese
market to ask for technology transfer from the foreign companies in the hope to upgrade
China’s technology to produce the IC. Yet, the semiconductor companies created by the state,
whether state-owned or joint-ventures, failed to narrow the technological gap between China
and the world and the production gap between Chinese consumption and production.
II.1.1 State-Led Development: Prior to 2000
China is actually among the world’s first group of nations that invested in developing
semiconductor technologies. The country’s first semiconductor was made as early as 1956
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(Dewey Ballantine 2003). The Chinese Academy of Science, China’s premiere state lab,
created the country’s first integrated circuit (IC) in 1964, only seven years after IC was
invented in the Bell Lab in United States (Simon 1987). Yet political turbulence during the
Cultural Revolution disrupted the country’s IC research and development (R&D). When the
country reorganized for technological catch-up, the technological gap between China and the
industrialized world had considerably widened.
Rather than the limited capabilities of the research institutions to develop technologies,
however, it is the lack of effective mechanisms for the production units to utilize the
developed technologies that hindered innovation in the planned economy (Simon 1987; Lu
2000). In the mid-1980s, Denis F. Simon (1987) observed that the actual production
technology being employed by the Chinese semiconductor manufacturers was even more
backward than that in the state labs. The prevailing technology used in plants in Shanghai,
one of the primary chip production locations in China, had an integration density of 1K or 4K
and line-width (width of feature on the chip surface) no smaller than 5 to 6 microns - the
technology that existed in state labs before 1979. Even such technologies were not effectively
utilized: yields were as poor as 20 to 40 percent (i.e., 60 to 80 percent of the produced
semiconductors were rejected), output was low and quality was unstable. (Ibid) At the same
time, the best Japanese producers had achieved yields of 70 to 80 percent, with much higher
reliability of chips (Ibid). Characterized as high-cost, low-quality products, domestically
produced semiconductors were unable to compete with imported ones, which were ready to
flood in as China slowly opened for trade.
The state of China was considered as the poor performance of a wide range of
industries as a technology issue and sought to solve the problem through technology import.
According to Hu (2006), China’s former minister of electronics industry, there were at least
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five major pushes from the state in fostering technological upgrades in the semiconductor
industry.
II.1.2 The First and Second Push
The first push was as early as in the 1970s that China imported seven semiconductor
production lines from Japan. The second push was the reform in early 1980s, which devolved
the authority of decision making to provincial level entities. Factories, labs, and universities
rushed to import second-hand lines. Similar large-scale importations of production lines also
occurred in sectors such as radio, color TV and refrigerators, exhausting China’s foreign
reserves in mid-1980s (Simon 1992).
By the beginning of the 1990s, China’s electronics industry began to take off, with the
share of electronics in total export climbing from only 6 percent in 1985 to 18 percent in
1990. (Ibid) Demand for semiconductor chips was driven by the emerging electronics and
computer industry. In 1989, IC consumption in China was estimated to be between 350
million and 400 million chips, while domestic production totaled 114 million (Ibid). However
the backward IC plants could hardly meet technological demand of the growing
microcomputer, telecommunication, and consumer electronics manufacturers. The production
of relatively sophisticated products, such as color TV, relied heavily on importing chips from
abroad (Li 2011). In late 1980s, the shortage of foreign exchange for importing foreign
components further worsened, causing severe under-utilization of the imported production
lines.
II.1.3 The Third Push – Creation of MEI and three Joint Ventures
The third push was state’s response to state’s lack of to build state’s backbone
enterprises. Industry planners responded by consolidating the sector to built a national
champion State-owned Enterprise (SOE) – Huajing. In 1989, the China Electronics
Corporation (CEC) was created by the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI) as the
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ministry-level corporate entity to own and manage the country’s large state-owned
electronics enterprises, aiming to consolidate manufacturing and R&D efforts and foster the
emergence of technologically advanced enterprises with large scale productive capabilities.
In the semiconductor sector, the first task for CEC was to build Huajing, a backbone Stateowned Enterprise (SOE) conglomerate. With limited resources such as foreign exchange
reserves available, planners were also searching for new ways of promoting the industry
using resources outside of the budgetary system. Since MEI concentrated resources on
Huajing, regional governments were allowed to establish joint ventures (JV) to access foreign
capital and technology (Fuller 2005). Three major JVs in the semiconductor sector were
established by the mid-1990s, with two in Shanghai and one in Beijing Shanghai Bell,
Shanghai Philips, and Shougang-NEC. Through the restructuring started in late 1980s, the
four enterprises, Huajing, Shanghai Belling, Shanghai Philips and Shougang-NEC emerged
as the backbone enterprises in the semiconductor sector in the 1990s.
II.1.4 The Fourth Push Push – Project 908
The third push created a group of national champions; the fourth push was concerned
with strengthening their technological capabilities. The microelectronics industry was
recognized as a strategic industry to be supported (officially “Pillar Industry”) in the Eighth
Five Year Plan (FYP 1991-1995). As a part of the planning, MEI initiated Project 908 in
1990 to upgrade the backbone enterprises, with the plan of deploying a mainstream 200mm
(6-inch) wafer fabrication line (or fab) (Li 2011), which was the largest wafer size at that
time, and establishing a dozen of semiconductor design centers, one test and packing firm,
and six fab equipment supply projects. Yet, when the fab deployed at Huajing finally came
online in 1997 after a long delay, the ambitions in Project 908 to close the international
technology gap had not been realized (Ibid). Technological advance in the semiconductor
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industry was simply moving too fast; by 1997, a 200mm fab trailed leading-edge
international technologies (Ibid).
The failure of Project 908 was due to the delays, a result of bureaucratic inertia, lowlevel skills, and management incapability (Ibid). Inefficient coordination occurred among
ministries and their departments in establishing a feasible project plan. To come to project
approval, it took four years to overcome the debates and quarrels on plan details such as
selection of locations, types of equipment and products, and sources for technology transfer.
According to Li (2011)’s survey, for example, if Huajing wanted to import a lithography
machine used for chip fabrication, it had to submit several documents to different parts of
MEI for approval. As the timeline slipped and required investment increased, tensions arose
between the Ministry of Electronics Industry and the Ministry of Finance, which was
unwilling to allocate extra-budget finance in the project and caused additional delays. In
addition, Project 908 made a major divergence from the coordinated supply chain in the
planned economy, for it established a semiconductor production chain of chip design,
manufacturing, and even some components of wafer supply, but had not included chip users
in the coordination. Clearly for Huajing, an IDM that supplied chips to electronics
manufacturers, having the advanced process technologies without an instantly marketable
product became a huge problem. As reported by engineers from Lucent Technologies,
Huajing’s fab, though complemented with chip design centers using an IP library from
Lucent, had no orders to produce most of the time (Fuller 2005).
Operating this expensive production line incurred heavy losses for Huajing, which was
not able to utilize the newer technology to generate marketable products, even though Lucent
had trained workers and engineers. In 1997, Huajing recorded a loss of RMB 240 million (Li
2011). Bearing the failure of Project 908, Huajing lost further support from the state, and was
later acquired by China Resource, a conglomerate that owned CSMC in 2003.
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II.1.5 The Four Enterprises’ Failure in Catch-up
The four enterprises, Huajing, Shanghai Belling, Shanghai Philips and Shougang- NEC,
were all built to serve China’s thriving electronics and telecommunication industry. Huajing
and Shanghai Philips initially produced ICs for television and audio use. Shanghai Belling’s
main products were chips used in digital telecommunication switching, and Shougang-NEC
supplied ICs for another NEC joint venture that produced program-controlled telephone
exchange. But since their establishment, these enterprises could not catch up with the
increasing rates of technological change in the electronics sectors. With aid from Lucent
Technologies, Project 908 was planning to install advanced telecommunication switching
manufacturing capability in Huajing, which completely failed. Shanghai Philips, which
changed its name to Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. in 1995 after Nortel
joined the venture (Nortel and Philips each took a third of the shares), upgraded to a 200mm,
0.8-to 1-micron fab in 1998. But this level was only roughly in-line with the technology
targeted in Project 908 (Li 2011).
Shougang-NEC was the only exception. NEC later in 1996 upgraded the facility to
200mm, 0.5-micron process technology, and expanded its product line to dynamic random
access memory (DRAM) and application specified integrated circuits (ASICs). The relatively
active role of NEC may be due to the fact that Shougang-NEC was a captive facility that
produced components for NEC’s export ventures (Ibid), while chips the other three firms
were consumed in the domestic market.
II.1.6 Project 909 – Fifth Push – China’s Last State-Led, Large-Scale Project
The aftermath of Project 908, however, had not stopped the Chinese state from pushing
further into the industry. Inspired by President Jiang Zemin’s ambition in building worldclass semiconductor enterprises after the Korean model, MEI launched the national Project
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909 in December 1995, targeting commercial 200mm, 0.35- to 0.5-29micron process
technology (Naughton 1999).
MEI’s ambition for the project was to achieve three goals. The first goal was to
establish China’s own semiconductor technology in the form of an IP portfolio. The second
was to create an international competitive semiconductor enterprise based on China’s huge
market. The third was to train a group of skilled engineers and managers in the industry
(Fuller 2005).
Thus, rather than deploying a new fab in an existing SOE, MEI planned to establish a
new state-owned corporate entity, Huahong Group, to execute the project with the
experiment of a new form of industrial organization. Hu Qili, head of MEI and a highranking cadre in the Communist Party, became the chairman of the board of the Huahong
Group to exercise direct control over the project. Several senior officials from the Shanghai
municipality also joined the management.
Project 909 was China’s last state-led, large-scale project in the semiconductor industry
(Li 2011), described by Hu Qili as the “fifth push”, but it is also the largest and the only one
that achieved modest success (Ibid). The project involved capital investment in excess of
RMB ten billion, larger than the sum of all prior state investment in the semiconductor sector
(Hu 2006). Even more unusual is the way in which the budgets were allocated. Through a
special arrangement between the State Council and Ministry of Electronics Industry, Minister
Hu Qili was given the authority of allocating the project budget, bypassing the Ministry of
Finance.
For Hu’s special status in both MEI and Huahong, such an arrangement gave Hu strong
control over the investment of Project 909 without interventions from other parts of the
bureaucracy. The cooperation from the Shanghai Municipality with several officials on board
further avoided bureaucratic barriers from the local actors. Hu later personally admitted that
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such arrangements gave Huahong unusual freedom in pursuing its investment plan, e.g., the
corporation was able to continue investing in its plant in the semiconductor downturn of 1997
(Li 2011).
The construction of the 200mm fab, which was the central piece of the project, was
undertaken by Huahong-NEC (HHNEC), established in 1997 as a joint venture between
Huahong and Japan’s NEC. NEC put up $200 million for a 28.6% stake in the JV, while
Huahong Group contributed $500 million for the remaining 71.4% of shares (Naughton
1999). HHNEC started to construct the fab in 1997, and entered pilot production very quickly
in the beginning of 1999 (Li 2011). The delay in Project 908 was avoided. Hu’s leadership
definitely helped to navigate through the bureaucratic system and overcame potential barriers
in decision-making. But perhaps what is equally, if not more, important in HHNEC’s rampup stage was the concession of fab management to the Japanese. Under the joint venture
agreement, NEC was contracted to manage the fab for the first five years and promised to
keep the new venture profitable.
II.1.7 Huahong’s Failure in Indigenous Innovation
Huahong invested in several design ventures with different partners, including NEC as
well as several Shanghai-based premiere research institutes, such as Fudan University,
Shanghai Metallurgical Research Institute, and Shanghai Computer Research Institute. The
design houses were supposed to build advanced skills to utilize HHNEC’s advanced process
capacity, especially given that the Beijing Huahong NEC IC Design Corp. was a part of the
technology transfer between Huahong and NEC. But in reality, designing a marketable chip
using HHNEC’s 0.25- to 0.5-micron process proved to be difficult.
This is not to say, however, that Huahong’s two main design houses, Beijing Huahong
NEC IC Design and Shanghai Huahong IC Design, had not engaged in some level of
indigenous innovation. Both companies had generated some successful products: for
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Shanghai Huahong smart cards used in transportation, banking and national ID cards, and for
Beijing Huahong SIM card chips used in cell phones. Yet those low-end products did not
actually require such a sophisticated process as that deployed as HHNEC, and thus were not
cost-effective ways to ramp up the expensive 200mm fab.
Table 2.1 Huahong’s Group Structure and Subsidiaries

Source: Li 2011
II.1.8 Business-Led Development; The Rise of The Chinese Foundries in the 2000s
Around the year of 2000, China experienced its largest wave of entry into the
semiconductor industry, in both chip manufacturing and chip design sector. In the chipmanufacturing sector, multinationals relocated their fabrication lines to take advantage of
cheap land, skilled labor, reliable infrastructure, tax benefits and a big market. But indigenous
firms were even more aggressive, employing more advanced technologies than
multinationals. From 2003 to 2008, domestic Chinese semiconductor manufacturers, not
foreign firms, accounted for over 80 percent of China’s annual productions (McClean et al
2009). During this time, China’s world-class semiconductor enterprise, Semiconductor
Manufacturing International (SMIC), emerged as a foundry startup. The other notable entrant
in the fabrication sector in 2000 was Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing (GSMC). Both
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foundry startups were located in Shanghai. Both foundries raised over one billion USD
investments from foreign venture capital, domestic banks and government entities to
construct their state-of-the-art fabs, starting from 200mm, 0.25- to 0.18-micron process.
SMIC would become more successful, owing to a mixture of technological expertise,
international market access, deep-pocketed investors and an aggressive expansion strategy
(Li 2011). Since 2004, SIMC has remained among the top five foundries globally.
In the chip design sector, the number of firms soared in the first three years of the 2000.
Throughout the 1990s, the number of Chinese semiconductor design firms rose steadily with
annual entries of 10 to 20 firms. After 2004, the number of chip design firms stabilized
around 500 (Ibid).
Table 2.2 Entries of major IDMs and foundries in China’s chip manufacturing industry
(1980-2010)

Source: Li 2011
The entry of foundries and design firms in early 2000s created a new industrial
ecosystem that is very different from that in the 1990s (Chesbrough 2005). In the design
sector, unlike the existing design firms that linked to system firms or integrated device
manufacturers (IDMs), the majority of the new design entrants tended to be fabless firms
with less than 250 employees that relied on outsourcing to foundries for the manufacture of
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their chips. In the chip fabrication sector, the two giant new entrants, SMIC and Grace had
both positioned themselves as foundry service providers. As demonstrated in Table 2.2, the
foundry became a dominant form for new entrants after 2000. Some of the older IDM firms,
seeing the opportunities provided by a growing number of fabless firms, had started to offer
foundry services as well. As a result, the foundry-fabless model became a dominant business
model, particularly in semiconductor clusters near Shanghai where new foundries and fabless
startups are highly concentrated.
Inside the firms, these new entrants organized their productive activities in distinctive
ways in terms of governance structure, employment relations and sources of finance. Teams
of scientist- and engineer-turned entrepreneurs, usually educated in the United States and
having substantial work experience, returned to establish and operate these startups. They
brought with them not only technological and management skills but extensive contacts to
access global markets and finance capital. Fabless design firms have tended to raise funds
from venture capital firms located in Silicon Valley with emerging domestic counterparts. (Li
2011) The foundries, requiring a huge fixed investment, often have their capital costs
shouldered by a combination of foreign venture capital firms, domestic banks and the
Chinese government. As shown in the Table 2.2, these new entrants often had a “mixed”
ownership structure, meaning shares were distributed among a variety of foreign and
domestic entities. The entrepreneurial teams were more likely to excise managerial control
with the absence of dominant shareholders such as the state. Even the old state-owned firms
that used to be controlled by bureaucrat-turned managers assigned by the state saw changes
in management. Thus with access to global markets, talent and capital, the foundry and
fabless startups in the 2000s were transforming the industry.
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II.2 Introduction to the History of Japan’s Development in the Sector
20 years ago, U.S. electronics manufacturers were the dominant global leader in such
key industries as semiconductors, automobiles and consumer electronics. US corporations set
industry standards, pioneered new technologies and controlled the largest share of world
markets. Japanese competitors at that time were hardly competitive enough to mount a
serious challenge, and Japan’s economy, even as late as 1960, 6 years after their entry, lagged
far behind. Japan had largely depended on overseas markets and raw materials as Japanese
viewed their country as small, backward, dependent and fragile. Japan had an early shortage
of capital to meet business investment demand, relied heavily on bank loans for corporate
financing and was dependent on foreign source of technology. No one anticipated Japan’s
emergence as the economic giant as it is today.
In 1986, 32 years after their entry, Japanese companies took over the dominant position
in the semiconductor industry from the United States. The growth of Japanese semiconductor
production had been phenomenal. Parlaying heavy capital investments into modern, highly
efficient plant facilities, the Japanese have managed to expand their world market share in
one industry after another by offering top-quality merchandise at very low prices, with the
promise of conscientious after-service.
II.2.1 Japan’s History of Development in the Semiconductor Industry
While

American

strength

lies

in

sophisticated

new

product

designs

like

microprocessors, which the U.S. companies develop and commercialize before anyone else,
the Japanese, however, excel at process and production technology. (Okimoto et al 1984)
For years following the end of the Second World War, the Japanese were notorious for
producing goods of poor quality, just like what the impression was for Chinese goods before
2000s. However, thanks to the adoption of quality control techniques formulated by such
American pioneers as William Deming and J.M.Duran, the problem was finally overcome
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(Ibid), and today the label “Made in Japan” stands for quality workmanship and unsurpassed
reliability. Japanese companies are said to have an easier time substituting capital for labor,
partly because their system of lifetime employment lowers labor union resistance to jobdisplacing mechanization (Abegglen 1973), and partly because capital is more abundantly
available for investment in new automated equipment (Okimoto et al 1984).
Competitiveness of Japan’s semiconductor industry was also affected by Japan’s
special political institutions and public policies. Japan hold a substantial—even “unfair”—
advantage because its government and private sector are believed to be a monolithic entity
that works in collusion against foreign competition. One reason Japan was largely feared by
U.S. is that Japan’s “national conglomerate” purportedly conferred an assortment of
advantages in the semiconductor industry that the first-comer at that time—America, which
has a decentralized market structure could never hope to duplicate: preferential lending,
nationally organized research project, flexible application of antitrust, and a “targeted”
industrial policy that assigns priority to high-growth industries like semiconductors and
provides a clear framework for the management of Japan’s industrial economy.
To track back to the history of the development of Japanese semiconductor industry,
Japanese and American interpretation of the development differ markedly.
II.2.2 Transistor
A transistor is a semiconductor device used to amplify and switch electronic signals
and power. It is the first semiconductor device that appears in the world’s semiconductor
history. Walter H. Brattain and John Bardeen at AT&T Bell Laboratories invented the
germanium transistor (Japan Semiconductor History Museum).
In the early days of transistor development, U.S. electronics companies developed new
consumer products as potential applications for the transistor, but since most of those
companies were already selling similar products using electron tubes, only a few companies,
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like Texas Instrument, which was not marketing electron tube products, were ready to move
aggressively into the transistor market. Japanese believed that it was owing to Japanese
efforts, led by Sony’s introduction of transistor radios in 1955, that the transistor and
products using it became popular (Okimoto et al 1984). It was noted by American industry
sources that Japanese companies entered the semiconductor industry early, in the 1950s, and
therefore have a longer history than most of the leading U.S. suppliers (Ibid). However, the
Japanese were relatively unsuccessful than U.S. in developing any applications other than inhouse use. The technology was moving rapidly but Japan lagged behind by at least two years.
As a result, the Japanese suffered a major setback in the early 1960s because they were
unable to compete effectively with companies like Texas Instruments and National
Semiconductor through the early 1970’s.
II.2.3 IC Era
According to Okimoto et al (1984), as Japan began mass-producing transistors, which
had been developed in the United States in the late 1940s, and promoted significant
improvements to the high-frequency characteristics and reliability, U.S. invented ICs in 1959,
opening the stage to the IC era. MOS ICs replaced transistors for the use of electronic
calculators from the mid-1960s. This created the first substantial demand for MOS ICs.
Originally manufacturing one calculator required several tens of ICs. Integration advanced
rapidly until only several chips were required in one calculator. Single-chip designs
eventually appeared in the early 1970s.
In the 1960s, many companies in Japan started trial-production of ICs for practical
applications. During the early days of MOS IC development, there was some concern about
instability caused by complex problems at the interface between silicon and silicon dioxide
layers. Due to these problems, it was said by Japanese that U.S. companies were reluctant to
invest heavily in the MOS IC production. Japanese semiconductor manufacturers, especially
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NEC and Hitachi, believed that new manufacturing technologies for mass production would
assure product quality and reliability. NEC foresaw a potential mass market for the desktop
calculator and in cooperation with Hayakawa (the predecessor of Sharp), developed
calculators using MOS ICs. They completed a commercial model in 1966, and the success of
this venture helped to establish the practicality of MOS ICs (Ibid).
Thus, as U.S. semiconductor companies focused on the military use of the
semiconductor and therefore took a lead in the innovation in the semiconductor technology,
Japanese semiconductor industry has not made any significant breakthrough in the 1960s in
the form of basic discoveries and inventions. However, it has contributed to the realizing the
broader potential of new semiconductor technologies. The R&D efforts of most Japanese
semiconductor manufacturers have relied heavily on basic technologies developed in the
United States, but Japanese semiconductor technology is not a mere copy of American
technology.
However, concerning Japan’s boldness in establishing a large-scale production line
when the commercial soundness of the MOS IC was still questioned by many people in the
U.S. industry hastened progress toward the LSI (Large Scale Integration, a technique
regarding ICs) and VLSI (Very Large Scale Integration) eras. Also, U.S. industry sources
stated that early MOS devices were well suited to the Japanese market, with its emphasis on
consumer products and calculators. Although calculators and watches using MOS circuits
were first produced in the United States, the Japanese saw the markets for these high-volume
consumer products as fitting their strategies well. Thus they aggressively pursued in these
markets.
Combining consumer, calculator and others, the personal electronics market segment
account for more than 50 percent of the IC market in Japan, showing the importance of
application of ICs in the personal electronics in Japan.
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Table 2.3 Domestic Japanese Consumption by Major Market Segment in 1979
Market Segment
Percent of Consumption
Consumer
29%
Computer
35
Communications
6
Test and measurement
2
Calculators
11
Other (including watches, automotive)
17
Source: BA Asia Ltd., 1980
After the Japanese began to produce MOS circuit on a large scale for desktop
calculators, the U.S. producers who had previously been the principal suppliers of the
Japanese gradually lost interest, for two reasons. First, the American companies found they
were losing their domestic customers. Second, they found selling in Japan difficult in the face
of what they saw as culturally engrained “Buy Japan” attitude. Indeed, at that time (the early
1970’s), the import of complex ICs into Japan for distributor stock was not permitted;
imports were only allowed for previously specified end customers.
II.2.4 Japan’s Targeted Industry and Trade Liberalization
In 1971 the six semiconductor-computer firms in Japan formed three paired groups:
Fujitsu-Hitachi, NEC-Toshiba, and Mitsubishi-Oki (Borrus et al 1982). Through these
pairings MITI hoped to force a specialization of development efforts and long-term
competitive segmentation of the computer market. Toward that end, each group received
subsidies totaling some $200 million dollars between 1972 and 1976. Also in 1971, MITI and
Japan’s Electronics Industry Association formed an LSI cartel among the ten major
semiconductor producers. Its purposes were to standardize LSI basic structures and packages,
to streamline and standardize manufacturing processes, and to develop LSI test equipment.
This cartel may indeed have been the seedbed for the device specialization among the major
Japanese firms.
Meanwhile, as U.S. companies have played the preeminent role in basic research and
the development of new semiconductor products since the invention of the transistor, there is
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every indication that the U.S. industry will continue to pour substantial resources into
research and new product design (Ibid). However, these areas of basic research and new
product development have generally been regarded as weak points in the Japanese
semiconductor industry. Some would say that this “weakness” has not been very costly to
Japan, because the Japanese industry has benefitted from a “free-ride” on U.S. R&D:
American companies have borne the burden of designing new products and supporting the
basic research that makes those products possible, while the Japanese, emphasizing the
development of process technology that enables them to replicate or adapt U.S. designs at
low cost and high quality, have often been able to capture a large share of the market in a
relatively short time (Ibid). The speed with which product generations occur in the
semiconductor industry has made it very profitable to the U.S. to be first with new product
designs. But as the time required to replicate semiconductor product designs has shrunk, the
commercial advantages of being the design leader have diminished.
The Japanese are sharply aware of their deficiencies in basic research and product
design, and they are determined to overcome them. In the first place, even if the commercial
advantages of being first with a new product are less than they once were, those advantages
are still significant. Moreover, Japanese engineers assert that technology transfer between
Japan and the United States has been one-sided. There is growing reluctance on the part of
some U.S. manufacturers to share their technology with the Japanese through licensing
agreements, and the Japanese increasingly recognize that continued access to the fruits of
U.S. research and development will depend, at least in part, on their offering enough to the
U.S. side to make a fair exchange.
It is within the context of these events that MITI’s liberalization of some of the
restrictions on foreign access to the Japanese market in semiconductors and computers,
announced in 1975, must be understood. During the previous four years of market protection
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and industry promotion, Japanese semiconductor-computer firms had developed a significant
LSI capability, and by 1976 they dominated their domestic market in all but the most advance
IC devices (Ibid). They had also succeeded in raising their share of the domestic installed
base of general-purpose digital computers to over 60 percent. They were thus in a dominant
position in their domestic market at a time when the issue of a protected domestic base from
which to enter international competition in LSI-based mainframes had been significantly
mooted by international market developments.
Liberalization of trade in components and computer, with continued structural control
over the character and composition of penetration, thus made sense-especially when
combined with a program of promotion aimed at VSLI. Moreover, liberalization also made
great political sense because the industrialized West was in the midst of a mid-decade cycle
of recession and recovery, and Japan was exporting excess domestic capacity in a range of
economic sectors. The beginning clamor in the United States and Europe for domestic
protection against Japanese imports could best be countered by liberalizing access to the
Japanese market. In preparation for liberalization and the push toward advance LSI, the
Japanese semiconductor-computer industry regrouped in late 1975. Fujitsu, Hitachi, and
Mitsubishi formed a joint venture—Computer Development Industries, Ltd.—to develop
VLSI and the next generation of computer prototypes (Gresser 1980). Finally, MITI, NTT,
and the five major semiconductor-computer firms organized the VLSI project, and in March
197 they formed the VLSI Technology Research Association (Tilton 1971).
Thus Japan’s government-supported project on VLSI research and the more recent
program on optoelectronics represent a major effort on the part of the Japanese to boost basic
research capabilities and to foster the development of new products and processes.
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II.2.5 VLSI Project
The real success of Japanese producers, according to American industry sources, came
only after the mid-1970s (Okimoto et al 1984). MITI targeted the computer and
telecommunication markets as central to Japan’s future. Establishing a national goal to lead
in those industries, the government offered substantial incentives to encourage R&D and
investment, besides restricting foreign access to Japanese markets.
A major thrust of Japan’s effort to contribute to basic semiconductor technology has
been the well-publicized program for industry-government cooperation in VLSI research.
Actually there have been two VLSI products, one directed at communications applications
and the other at computer applications. The communications-oriented project began in 1975
under the management of the Electrical Communication Research Laboratories of Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT), which falls under the administrative
guidance of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication. NEC, Hitachi, and Fujitsu
cooperated in this project, and government support was provided in the form of procurement.
NTT did not give direct financial support, and the three cooperating companies invested their
own R&D money on the supposition that the investment would be recovered through future
procurement.
In the first phase of the project, which ended in the 1977 fiscal year, the major
objectives were to investigate the practical limit of photolithography and to study basic
micron and submicron device technologies. In 1971 the Japanese government introduced a
national policy for the promotion of certain industries, which targeted the development of
advanced technologies (Mackintosh 1979). According to Cupertino (1983), the Law for
Provisional Measures to Promote Specific Electronic and Machinery Industries designated
three strategic categories: 1) advanced technologies needing direct R&D support-especially
technologies like LSI, where Japanese firms lagged considerably behind U.S. firms, 2)
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production technologies, like those demanded in LSI production, which were intimately
linked to device-system cost, quality and performance, and 3) high-volume production
technologies. MITI was given responsibility for financing R&D and rationalizing production.
By 1977 over sixty different projects had received total financial support in the multi-hundred
million dollar range in such areas as electron-beam exposure and LSI production equipment,
high performance discrete devices, basic materials research, low power-high performance
ICs, and VLSI’s.
The second phase, lasting for another three years, applied the results of the first phase
to develop special purpose LSI for communications and to carry on the development of other
new technologies for communication.
According to Cupertino (1983), the more publicized computer-oriented project, partly
founded by MITI, ran from 1976 to 1970. The objective of this project was to develop VLSI
technology as a key to the future development of computer systems. As is well known, MITI
has singled out computer development as an area of highest priority for the Japanese
economy in the 1980’s. The project budget was around 70 billion yen (about $200 million)
over the four-year-period. About 60 percent of the total budget was financed by the five
member companies; the rest came from MITI in the form of interest-free loans to the member
companies, to be repaid from royalty income and profits derived from the products that
resulted from technologies developed by the project.
As a result of the project, more than 1,000 patents were issued, and about 460 technical
papers were published (Borrus et al 1982), many of them as part of international conferences
in the United States, Europe, and Japan. In the late 1970s, significant growth in the Japanese
market for semiconductor products in computers, telecommunications, and industrial
purposes under way.
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II.2.6 The 65K and 256K DRAM Competition
The determination of the Japanese to compete with the United States in the
development of new product prototypes has been most apparent in the development of stateof-the-art VLSI memory chip technology – specifically, the 64K and 256K DRAM (Dynamic
Random-Access Memory). The competition for market share in the 64K DRAM, successor to
the 16K DRAM, is a test for producers of memory chips. Sales of the 64K DRAM are
expected to reach a peak of $1.8 billion by 1985 (Ibid). By 1989 the annual market for the
245K chips is expected to hit $3,7 billion. The Japanese have spent very heavily to develop
and produce these chips, and this is the area in which the most dramatic Japanese successes
have been achieved. Although IBM reportedly produced the 64K DRAM in high volume well
in advance of the competition, the first 64K DRAM to reach the merchant market was
Japanese, introduced by Fujitsu in 1978 (Okimoto 1984).
By the end of 1981, the Japanese had captured 70 percent of the 64K DRAM market,
and some industry commentators declared that Japan had “won” the battle for the memory
market. As the U.S. computer industry used more DRAMs, resulting to rapidly increasing
demand for DRAMs, many U.S. computer manufacturers adopted made-in-Japan DRAMs,
which had been acclaimed for their quality. Japanese DRAMs reached the leading edge in
terms of design and process technologies, now gaining high evaluations for quality, delivery,
and price. The Japanese share of market in 64K-DRAMs overtook US in 1981, and overall
DRAM share reached to 80% in 1987 mainly with 256K DRAMs.
According to Figure 2.2, within the global market of DRAM in the 1980s, Japan
surpassed the United States in 1982 and continued to rise in the following 5 years, peaking at
80% of the DRAM market share in 1987.
One reason why the Japanese were able to enter the 64K DRAM market so early and
with such strength was their adoption of a conservative design (Okimoto et al 1984). The
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Japanese used as a base for their 64K DRAM the cell design originally used in Mostek’s 16K
DRAM, improving on it, and in effect, scaling up the techniques that had proved successful
at the 16K level. Japanese engineers claim that the more conservative design of their chips
makes them more reliable, less apt to be defective.
Figure 2.2 Global Share (Japan, U.S., Europe, Asia) of DRAM Sales in 1980-1990
Note: pink-Japan, blue-U.S., brown-Europe, Green-Asia (except Japan)

Source: Semiconductor History Museum of Japan
In 1984, new types of consumer electronics, such as audio-visual equipment, became
broadly popular in the 1980s. Production by Japanese manufacturers who were highly
competitive in this field rapidly expanded to support the demand for Japanese semiconductor
products. Meanwhile, the growing demand for DRAMs triggered by the boom in 16-bit PCs
allowed Japanese semiconductor manufacturers to increase their share of the global market.
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In 1986, Japan becomes the biggest supplier in the global semiconductor market,
surpassing the U.S. Japanese manufacturers expanded their share due to increased memory
production (such as DRAMs) and stable domestic demand for consumer electronics. The top
three manufacturers in 1986 were NEC, Toshiba, and Hitachi, and six out of the top ten were
Japanese manufacturers.
Figure 2.3 Changing Market Share Changes in the World’s Semiconductor Shipments:
United States and Japan in 1982-1992

Source: Nikkei Tsushin
II.2.7 Japan in the 1990s
However, in the 1990s, The Japanese semiconductor industry struggled with the
regulations defined by the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement such as Fair Market
Value (FMV) and allowing more foreign semiconductor products into the market
(Semiconductor History Museum of Japan). This situation continued until the agreement
expired in 1996. Moreover, The Japanese share dropped when South Korean and Taiwanese
manufacturers joined the global semiconductor market and U.S. manufacturers regained
competitiveness. South Korea reorganized its semiconductor industry and actively
encouraged development and investment after the financial crisis of the late 1990s, rapidly
raising its status in the field of DRAMs.
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II.2.8 Japan in the 2000s
In the early 2000s, Japan started a series of government-industry projects in Japan with
main focus to fabrication technologies. However, the business environment for vertically
integrated Japanese device manufacturers worsened as the semiconductor industry came to be
based on a flatter and horizontally divided structure.
Table 2.4 China and Japan’s Timeline of Development (China on the left and Japan on
the right)

Source: compiled by the author
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III Analysis and Comparison of China and Japan’s
Development History in the Semiconductor Industry
Chinese and Japanese different development paths in the semiconductor industry could
be traced to a couple of factors.
Firstly, an important factor that distinguishes Japan and China’s different technological
sophistications is Japan’s alliance with the United States, which promoted economic
cooperation and access to the technological information, while China’s development in the
semiconductor industry was immensely disrupted by the political turbulence during the
Cultural Revolution. Japan started the development of its semiconductor industry early in the
1960s and had depended on U.S. R&D by taking a “free-ride”. U.S. companies have
shouldered the responsibility of designing new products and conducting the basic research
that makes those products possible, while the Japanese, emphasizing the development of the
process technology that enables them to replicate or adapt U.S. designs at low cost and high
quality, have often been able to capture a large share of the market in a relatively short time.
In Japan, engineers were permitted relatively free access to U.S. technologies—compared
with China’s limited access to U.S. technologies—through frequent conference attendances
and company visits during the 1950s and 1960s (Flamm 1996). By concentrating on
acquiring U.S. licenses and patents, Japanese firms soon were able to start low-cost mass
production by the late 1950s. By 1959, Japan had overtaken the United States in output
volume to become the world’s largest transistor producer.
On China’s side, China did not reorganize for technological catch-up until in late
1970s. China is counted as a latecomer, who fell behind in the technological sophistication.
According to Li (2011), when Japan began mass production of 256K DRAM in 1984, China
just finished making 4K DRAM in 1979, 16K DRAM in 1980 and 64K DRAM in 1985. The
wide technological gap was hard to be made up by indigenous R&D (research and
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development) in China. Nor did China have the U.S. as ally who was willing to transfer
technology to China. In fact, China’s technological advance has been hindered by U.S. export
control.
Secondly, the differences in the efficiency in the technological catch-up between China
and Japan were partly due to the differences in the economic and political systems. Japanese
and Chinese economic systems differ largely because Japan has always been a marketoriented economy while China experienced an economic transformation from a command
economy to a market-oriented economy. Japan’s semiconductor industry emphasized
commercial application and was boosted by demand-pull when Japan’s early comer—the
U.S.—concentrated on the military market, while China suffered from lack of a marketoriented mechanism to create the market for semiconductors. In contrast to U.S. companies,
which conducted R&D according to the dominant needs in the military market and from the
National Science Foundation’s stress on fundamental knowledge, the Japanese system
emphasized commercial application and economic advancement. When the U.S. companies
developed their strength in sophisticated new product design like microprocessors and led
ahead in software, an area that accounted for a growing portion of value-added and was often
decisive for the functioning of end-product systems like microcomputers, the Japanese,
however, focused on excelling at process and production technology. Boosted by the
increasing end-use demand for consumer electronics and computer industries, the Japanese
semiconductor industry had grown substantially by the late 1960s. And finally, through
Japan’s heavy investment in its memory chip development, Japan surpassed the United States
in 1986 in the semiconductor volume, largely credited to its large DRAM chip demand.
On the Chinese side, in contrast to Japan, whose application technology fit in its market
of personal electronics, China did not have a market-oriented mechanism that promoted the
application of the semiconductor the country developed. At the end of the 1990s, China’s
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domestic semiconductor industry was insignificant internationally by any standard of
measurement. Foreign-made chips dominated the middle- to high-end of the Chinese market,
as the country imported more than 80 percent of the chips it consumed.
Nevertheless, China’s economic system grew more market-oriented and liberalized, the
types of strategy, organization and finance of non-government semiconductor companies in
the 2000’s conformed more closely to the types of investment strategies and business
structures that could generate innovation. Founded and managed by expatriate technoentrepreneurs, these enterprises (SMIC and Grace) started to have very capable decision
makers who were available in China. Meanwhile liberalized government policy that
experimented transferring decision-making power to the entrepreneurs, combined with the
rise of fabless-foundry model, provides a good opportunity to China to leverage its
comparative advantage and profit from its labor-intensive condition.
Thus it leads to the third reason that contributes to the different development path of
Chinese and Japanese semiconductor industry, comparative advantage. To compare the two
countries’ histories of development, Japan leveraged its advantage in substituting capital for
labor or its comparative advantage in capital while China targeted its comparative advantage
in labor and leveraged the new emerged fabless-foundry model by concentrating on
fabrication.
Fourthly, both states played crucial roles in manipulating the development of the
semiconductor industry by large-scale industrial projects. Both China and Japan’s
governments built up “unfair” advantages by promoting their export competitiveness and
triggering technological catch-up by massive investment in R&D. Japan’s government
targeted prospective industries while providing aid to a certain industries and limiting foreign
competition whereas Chinese government also closed its market and imposed import barriers
prior to the 2000’s. Interestingly, both governments employed strategies to cultivate large
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national champions. But the private firms dominated Japan while the state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) dominated China. Nevertheless after the 2000’s China chose a ‘walking-out’ strategy
and encouraged foreign investment in order to leverage China’s lab-abundant comparative
advantage.
In the rest of this chapter, I will elaborate on my comparison between Chinese and
Japanese development histories in the semiconductor industry, divided into four sections –
comparative advantage, economic and political systems, government policy and trade policy.

III.1 Comparative Advantage
International trade has played a significant role leading to China’s economic growth
since its economic liberalization in 1978. International trade gradually sets up a sizeable
portion of China’s overall economy. Initially, exports were majorly concentrated in industries
such as textiles and manufacturing. In the 1990’s, however, high-tech electronics exports
became the most dynamic sector of export growth. Between 1980 and 2000, electronics
exports have grown by an average annual rate of 43 percent, almost three times as fast as
total exports (Assche 2006). According to Assche (2006), in 2000, electronics exports were
28 percent of total exports. As a result, China has turned into one of the main traders of
electronics products, with a 4.5 percent share of global electronics exports in 2000. In 2000,
China had an electronics trade surplus of US$51.4 billion (Ibid), largely due to the export of
electronics final products to the developed country such as the United States, Canada, Japan
and Western Europe.
China’s success in the high-tech electronics exports has led to a rising concern in the
developed country with an illusion that China not only specializes in labor-intensive
industries but also in high-tech industries such as electronic equipments. The cause of this
misunderstanding is that the electronics industry should be a capital-intensive industry with
demanding requirements for advanced technology, which China should not have been
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capable of. This concern is further fuelled by the recent Chinese electronics champions, who
have successfully penetrated overseas markets and turned into global competitors. For
example, in the consumer electronics industry, Haier has surged to become the world’s
fourth-largest manufacturer of large household appliances. In the computer industry, Lenovo
has made its name by purchasing IBM’s PC unit and becoming the first Chinese company to
sponsor the Olympic Games. In the telecommunications equipment sector, Huawei and ZTE
have emerged as a comparable competitor to Cisco and Nortel. But comparative advantage
theory reassures that China’s success in the trade in the electronics industry is just a standard
case.
To explain the reasons of China’s success in the electronics industry, we must first
identify the differences between competitive advantage and comparative advantage. A
competitive advantage is an advantage that a firm has over its competitors, allowing the firm
to generate greater sales revenue, or retain more customers than its competitors. A
competitive advantage contains two types of advantages, cost advantage and comparative
advantage. A usual confusion usually occurs between two. A competitive advantage is an
advantage that enterprises can utilize to retain low costs to undercut. However, a comparative
advantage refers to the ability of a country or a firm to produce a particular good at a lower
opportunity cost – one country does not necessarily have a greater efficiency (absolute
advantage) over another; but rather each has a different relative efficiency.
When people think about China’s success in the international trade, the reason they
usually bear in mind is China’s advantage in the low labor cost. But the low labor cost is only
an example of a competitive advantage in China, a factor that should not be sufficient enough
to explain China’s tremendous trade surplus in a high-tech industry – only to prove China’s
comparative advantage in the electronics industry can justify China’s success.
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As I mentioned, a comparative advantage refers to the ability of a country or a firm to
produce a particular good at a lower opportunity cost. According to the Ricardian trade
theory, due to each country’s differences in technological equipments, amounts of resources
and costs of outsourcing, each country specializes in different sectors because if scarce
factors of production are used to produce two goods, producing more of one good always
requires producing less of the other good. Thus the idea of opportunity cost emerges. The
opportunity cost of producing more of one good is the required reduction in the production of
the other good. Similarly, the opportunity cost of producing some amount of one good is the
amount of the other good that could have been produced with the same resources.
Consequently, if one country is capable of producing one good with less opportunity cost, it
has comparative advantage in producing this good.
Later Eli Heckscher and Bertil Olin developed a general equilibrium model of
international trade – Heckscher-Olin model. Heckscher-Olin model builds on David Ricardo’
theory of comparative advantage by predicting patterns of commerce and production based
on the factor endowment of a trading region. According to Heckscher-Olin theorem, a
country will export goods that use its abundant factors intensively, and import goods that use
its scarce factors intensively. In the two-factor case, it states: "A capital-abundant country
will export the capital-intensive good, while the labor-abundant country will export the laborintensive good." The reason is that when two countries are in autarky, the price of capitalintensive good in the capital-abundant country will be low because of the oversupply. Same
result applies to the labor-intensive good in the labor-abundant country.
Back to the story, China has long been known as a country that is labor-abundant,
rather than capital-abundant, compared with developed countries such as the U.S. and Japan.
Thus if according to the comparative advantage theory, the usual understanding is that China
would have a lower price in the labor-intensive textile industry and thus have a trade surplus
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in the textile industry while having a trade deficit in high-tech electronics industry because
the electronics industry is usually considered to be capital-intensive. So the question is why is
China having a trade surplus in the high-tech electronics industry? Should China remain
specialized in the electronics industry?
To solve this question, RCA index should be utilized to illustrate each country’s
specialization. RCA is known as Revealed Comparative Advantage, which is a measurement
put out by The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). RCA
identifies the ratio of exports of each Chinese (or any country’s) product to each region by

comparing it with the average global exports ratio. Therefore RCA is defined by

X kj X wk
X j Xw

where X denotes exports, k denotes the commodity group classification of exports, j denotes
€
the particular country in question, and w refers to the world. Therefore, China’s electronics

products’ RCA for global trade = (Amount of Chinese electronics product exported
globally/Total amount of global electronics exports)/Amount of Chinese product exported
globally/Total of global exports). Therefore, when RCA is more than one, the product can be
seen to have comparative advantage.
Table 3.1 RCA of China and Japan in the Electronics Industry
Country
1996
2001
2002
2003

2004

China

0.71

1.02

1.45

1.48

1.95

Japan

2.34

1.92

1.58

1.65

1.69

Source: COMTRADE
According to the data on the UN COMTRADE, China’s RCA in the electronics
industry is constantly increasing while Japan’s RCA has been decreasing or maintaining a
minor increase. From Figure 3.1, it shows China’s RCA in the electronics industry has been
growing very fast. China’s RCA in the electronics industry surpasses 1 in 2001 and is
reaching 2 in 2004, clearly showing China’s comparative advantage in the electronics
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industry, while Japan is decreasing from 2.3 in 1996 to 1.7 in 2004. In 2004, China’s RCA in
the electronics industry has already surpassed Japan’s. But is Japan really loosing?
Figure 3.1 RCA of China and Japan in the Electronics Industry
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Note: The RCA index is defined by:
where X denotes exports, k denotes the
commodity group classification of exports, j denotes the particular country in question, and w
refers to the world.
!
Figure 3.2 the Ratio of Japan’ s RCA to China’s RCA in Final Products and Partially
Completed Products

Source: Summary Report on Trade of Japan (Japan Tariff Association)
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Figure 3.3 the Ratio of Japan’ RCA to China in Materials and Electronic Components

Source: Summary Report on Trade of Japan (Japan Tariff Association)
X kj X wk
X X
The RCA index is defined by: j w where X denotes exports, k denotes the commodity
group classification of exports, j denotes the particular country in question, and w refers to
the world. In this graph, the index on the Y-axis is Japan’s RCA compared to China’s.
!
A closer look at China’s electronics import and production data shows that the rising

sophistication of China’s exports in fact does not reflect its electronics companies’
technologic development. In order to explain this statement, we compare Japanese RCA to
Chinese RCA in the two sectors – partially completed/completed sectors and parts sectors.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the ratio of Japan’s RCA to China’s RCA in final products and
partially completed products and Figure 3.3 shows the ratio of Japan’s RCA to China’s RCA
in materials and electronic components. According to Figure 3.2, when Japan’s RCA index is
compared against China during 1995–2002, there is a downward trend for most items in the
sector of products and partially completed products except for metal processing equipment
and communications equipment. Television equipment shows the largest downward trend in
the ratio of Japan’s RCA to China’s RCA. The decreasing ratio of Japan’s RCA to China’s
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RCA in final products and partially completed products re-demonstrates China’s rising
dominance in the production of final electronic products.
However, this is only a part of the whole picture. When we take a look at the sector of
materials and parts, however, Japan’s RCA compared to China for electronic components such as semiconductor - is still gradually increasing. From Figure 3.3, steel and metals are
not on an upward trend because China is a large country abundant with natural resources. But
for electronic components, which play key functions in electronic equipments, China’s
comparative advantage is decreasing, compared with Japan’s.
In other words, in regards to the specialization structure with China—including
Japanese affiliates located in China—the comparative advantage of high value parts
manufactured by companies located in Japan against China is still increasing. This tendency
indicates the international specialization relationships between Japan and China,
demonstrated by Japan’s shift in the trade structure from products/partially completed
products to highly functional materials/part—Japan tend to specialize in producing
material/part which requires high-tech and outsources assembly line to China. This shift, in
turn, is in line with the development of international specialization in China.
China’s role in the international trade remains labor-intensive. Chinese companies have
not become specialized in producing key components yet and are still depending on
procurements from foreign companies; their strength is mostly in the form of production
specialized in processing and assembly. In fact, many Japanese and other Asian companies
located in China are focused on processing and assembly in order to take advantage of the
low labor costs, leading to the structural dependence of China on imports from Japan for key
components. China imports highly complex electronics components from abroad and uses
low-skilled workers to assemble them in export goods. In such way the production activities
of electronics firms in China generally remain relatively unsophisticated. Therefore, China’s
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story of large exports in the high-tech electronics industry does not mean that it is diverting
from the Heckscher-Olin theorem, rather it is just a standard trade theory case.
In fact, in recent decades, non-Chinese electronics companies have been relocating
their assembly plants from other East Asian countries to China, thus making China a global
assembly platform for electronics products such as computers, telecommunications
equipment and consumer electronics. These firms continue to rely on Japanese companies for
the primary source for their electronic components such as semiconductors, but are
assembled in China. Once the assembly is completed, they export the final goods to Western
countries. These trends are clearly reflected in China’s electronics trade balance in Figure
3.4.
Figure 3.4 China’s Electronics Trade Balance

Source: United Nations-NBER Trade Data, 2006
As the graph shows, China has a huge trade surplus towards Japan and United
In the electronics component sector, China has held trade deficit to every country in
ASEAN-4 region and to the United States. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 3.4, China’s trade
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deficit in electronics components is almost entirely driven by the import of complex “active
components” such as semiconductors and integrated circuits. The trade deficit in the less
complex “passive components” such as capacitors, resistors and printed circuit boards is
much smaller. This trade dynamic figure reassures China’s role in the electronics industry in
the context of international trade.
III.1.1 Comparative Advantage in the Semiconductor Industry
In the semiconductor industry, China initially was merely selling the country’s
comparative advantage in cheap labor and land, which is at the very last stage of a supply
chain. In this stage, technologically advanced countries transfer primary fabrication and
assembly chain to technologically disadvantaged countries but keep high-tech fabrication,
R&D and marketing domestically. In this stage, China relies on the cheap labor to gain small
processing fee, which is what happened in China before the 2000s. After the 2000s, China
gradually imported advanced technology and capital stock and moved toward the stage of a
fabrication foundry, stepping towards capital-intensive stage.
With the creation of wafer industry by TSMC in 1987, many IDM (integrated device
manufacturer) semiconductor manufacturer transformed into fables and foundry model,
turning a vertically integrated model into different stages. With the emergence of the fablessfoundry model, countries are able to make better use of each country’s comparative
advantages. Manufacturing is usually outsourced to a third party – in the current global
industry, China, Korea and Taiwan in the most cases – in order to leverage cheap
manufacturing cost. Thus China is able to leverage the country’s labor-abundant comparative
advantage and concentrate on wafer foundry, packaging and testing while knowledgeabundant countries such as United States and Japan focus on semiconductor design and
fabrication.
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On the other hand, Japan, as a “resource-poor nation” dependent on the export of
manufactures to pay even today for the importation of almost 90 percent of its energy needs,
over half of its food, and the greater part of its chief resources, the Japanese choose industries
for domestic development that can serve to expand oversea sales. Unlike China that has
abundant land and labor resources, Japan does not have the same economic condition.
Thus the conscious theme of policy in Japan has been to create comparative advantage
in high value-added industries as an alternative to remaining dependent on the labor-intensive
resources and capital. The state aggressively promoted the shift out of agriculture into
industry and out of low-wage into high-wage industrial sectors. Government policy served to
channel resources into those industries for which there were growing domestic demand and
potential economies of scale to facilitate export. Thus the state targeted a certain industries
that would help Japan grow out of labor-intensive resources. In fact, the state played a crucial
role in manipulating the access of foreign competitors to domestic Japanese market in order
to promote their export competitiveness. Thus in pursuit of MITI (Ministry of International
Trade and Industry)’s goal of creating comparative advantage in the knowledge-intensive and
technology-intensive industries, the Japanese had to turn a relatively backward
semiconductor industry into a world-class competitor. This is the reason why during the
1970s, the Japanese industry moved from a consumer product orientation and a position of
relative technological inferiority in components toward a state-of-the-art capability in
components, telecommunications, and computers.

III.2 The Economic and Political System Difference
Japanese and Chinese histories of semiconductor development are inevitably related to
the different economic and political system in both countries.
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III.2.1 China’s Centralized Economy in the History and Japan’s Free-Market
Firstly of all, the Japanese and Chinese economic systems differ largely because Japan
has been a market-oriented economy with government as a promoter while China
experienced economy transformation from command economy to market-oriented economy
with government controlling the decision-making power. Japan’s semiconductor industry
emphasized commercial application and is boosted by the demand-pull when Japan’s early
comer—the U.S.—concentrated in the military market, while China suffered from lack of a
market-oriented mechanism to create the market for semiconductors. Even now, China is still
under the strict control of the state, and government has the rights to intervene in the market
to a certain degree.
In China’s economic history, starting from 1949, the CCP in China adopted a planned
economy and created institutional arrangements to lower the barriers to the development of
heavy industries, i.e., low interest rates, depressed product and factor prices, and a central
resource allocation system. While this system quickly established a relatively complete
industrial structure and likewise led to economic growth resulting from massive investment,
the costs associated with economic inefficiency were extremely high. For instance, there
were no links between the expansion of an enterprise and its economic efficiency, or between
workers’ income and their productivity. The power was centralized in the hand of the state
while the lower-provinces and enterprises have no economic power to invest. Thus in the
semiconductor industry, despite the fact that the Chinese Academy of Science, China’s
premiere state lab, created the country’s first integrated circuit (IC) in 1964, only seven years
after IC was invented in the Bell Lab in United States (Simon 1987), it was unable to be put
into commercial production because there was not a market-oriented resource allocation
system.
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As illustrated by Adam Smith, one of the founding fathers of economics, in a marketoriented economy, there is an invisible hand of the market operated in a competitive market
through the pursuit of self-interest to allocate resources in society’s best interest. This means,
in a market-oriented economy, supply and demand construct the price mechanism, which
signals the scarcities and surpluses of the resources. Individuals are left up to themselves to
decide what to produce, who to work for, and how to get the things they need. This type of
economy, though it may be chaotic at times, allows people to change along with the shifting
market conditions to maximize their profits. However in a planned economy like China in the
1960s, resources were not relocated according to the price mechanism but rather according to
the government’s command. Without price as a signal of the market, the market could not
reach its efficiency because the amount of production based on the principle of profitmaximization but rather based on the CPC’s planning. Without price as a signal of the
market, the CPC had no means to “predict” the market demand or allocate the resources
ideally. Instead of taking advantage of China’s labor-abundant comparative advantage, China
chose to develop the heavy industries that required massive capital and technology. Therefore
it was this lack of incentives severely suppressed productivity and resulted in low economic
efficiency.
On the other hand, the Japanese market ranks high among the world's market-oriented
economy. Thus the major economic system differences between China and Japan mark the
distinctness between their industrial development histories in the semiconductor industry.
Compared with China’s large state-led investment and development in the semiconductor
industry before the 2000’s, Japan’s development of the manufacturing capacity was largely
left to the private sector.
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III.2.2 Interference by Chinese Political Turmoil
Second of all, the Chinese technological lag-off is inevitably related to China’s political
turmoil during 1960s. Later Two of Mao’s campaigns brought chaos and severe economic
distress to the Chinese – “Great Leap Forward” from 1958 to 1961, which aimed to use
China’s vast population to transform the country from an agrarian economy to a country of
rapid industrialization, and the “Cultural revolution” from 1966 to 1976, which removed
capitalists from Chinese society. The disruption caused by the “Great Leap Forward” and the
“Cultural Revolution” led to the wide technology gap between China and the advanced
countries. In late 1970s, when China started to reorganize for technological catch-up, Japan,
as a military ally to the US, already imported many production technologies from the US,
such as silicon-transistor technology and became the largest transistor-manufacturing
country, progressing toward application technology and VLSI project.
III.2.3 China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Japan’s Private Firms
Under the Chinese system prior to 2000, the state was responsible for the development
of all sectors and decided all aspects of enterprises’ operations, for example, product range
and scope, investment, prices, wages, suppliers and purchasers. The major forms of the
ownership of the enterprises were state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Enterprises were required
to concentrate not on profit making, but rather on fulfillment of the production plan,
Industries were dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in cities and communes in the
countryside, with no private ownership permitted (Five Year Plan 1986-2004). Thus rather
than the limited capabilities of the research institutions to develop technologies, however, it is
the lack of effective mechanisms for the production units to utilize the developed
technologies that hindered innovation in the planned economy (Simon 1987; Lu 2000) Until
late 1990s, the state-owned and joint-venture semiconductor companies, which dominated in
China prior to 2000, were firmly controlled by agents of the state, particularly the ministries.
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Although these companies were large enterprises with huge investments by the Chinese
standards at the time, managers of these enterprises were effectively given little autonomy in
decision-making. This centralized decision-making structure in the bureaucratic hierarchy
caused two consequences. Firstly, managers were not able to make decisions to maximize the
profits of the firms. Thus secondly firms lost their competitiveness because the decisions
were made by political leader who might sacrifice some firms’ benefits for the cause of the
state. In such cases, managers no longer had incentives to improve the firms and thus result in
low management skills and corrupted managers.
In Japan, on the other hand, large private firms (keiretsu) dominated the market. Each
of the top six Japanese semiconductor companies was tied to a Keiretsu - a conglomerate
industrial grouping of companies arranged around either a single large bank or large
industrial firm (or several firms). The Keiretsu’s form ranged from groups with close
intercompany ties to looser, basically financial arrangements. The Keiretsu structure itself
provided important advantages for the Japanese electronics firms that could draw on its
resources. First of all, the Keiretsu members provided an important internal market for the
firm’s products (Borrus et al 1982). Second, each Keiretsu usually included a large trading
company, which was frequently used by Japanese firms to perform overseas sales,
distribution, and financing. The trading company thus provided increased access to
international semiconductor market. (Chase) It should also be noted that Japanese firms were
privately owned. Thus companies had autonomy in decision-making and government’s role
was to use market-oriented policy tools to provide incentives.
Moreover, in Japan’s economy, compared with Chinese government’s role as an
administrator, Japanese government played a role of an industrial promoter. Japan had
established a Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in order to serve the role as
an architect of industrial policy, an arbiter on industrial problems and disputes, and a
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regulator. MITI was responsible for shaping the structure of Japan’s industries, supervising
the healthy growth of those industries and their production and distribution activities,
managing Japan’s foreign trade and commerce, and controlling patents, industrial technology,
and technology acquisition (MITI Establishment Law). Over the years, MITI has successfully
“targeted” industries of increasing sophistication. MITI’s specific policies to promote the
market will be discussed in the government policy section.
III.2.4 Japan’s Bureaucracy-Business Relationship and China’s Bureaucratic Inertia
Another distinctive asset about the economic system in Japan is its close bureaucracybusiness relationship. The close relationship ensures a massive flow of exchange,
consultation, and consensus on broad technological objectives. This close governmentbusiness relationship was modeled after Germany, ensuring that government’s economic
policy was providing the correct incentives for the enterprises. Tensions and problems were
inevitable and require constant communication and compromise. Such a system, however,
functionsed far better than government-relations in China. While in China, without such a
consultation channel, government’s relatively centralized power in decision making led the
industry to a path that was not beneficial to the business environment. In China prior 2000,
the SOEs’ managers were not required to make decision to maximize profits positions. These
managers were inferior to the state’s decisions. And the enterprises could hardly negotiate
economic policies with the state. Such a system led to the bureaucratic inertia and
management incapability in China.
Project 908 was a proof of result of the bureaucratic inertia, low-level skills, and
management incapability in China. In the Project 908, described by Li (2011), the MEI (the
Ministry of Electronics Industry) allocated a budget of 2 billion RMB for the project, aiming
to leapfrog domestic technologies from the outdated 100mm (4-inch), 4.0-1.3 micron-width
processes into the submicron (0.8-1.2 micron) line-width era (Li 2011). Yet, when the fab
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deployed at Huajing finally came online in 1997 after a long delay, the ambitions in Project
908 to close the international technology gap had not been realized. Technological advance in
the semiconductor industry was simply moving too fast; by 1997, a 200mm fab trailed
leading-edge international technologies (Ibid).
During Project 908, even though China’s reform towards a market-oriented economic
system had gone underway for a decade, the logic of Project 908 was still similar to projects
of large-scale, state-led technological development under central planning. During Project
908 inefficient coordination occurred among ministries and their departments in establishing
a feasible project plan. To come to project approval, it took four years to overcome the
debates and quarrels on plan details such as selection of locations, types of equipment and
products, and sources for technology transfer.
III.2.5 Different U.S. Attitudes towards China and Japan
U.S. different attitudes towards Japan and China also led to the different speeds in the
technological catch-up. As the U.S.’ strategic ally, Japan started the development of its
semiconductor industry early in the 1960s and had depended on U.S. R&D by taking a “freeride”. The U.S. designed new products and conducted the basic research, while the Japanese
adapted U.S. designs at low cost and high quality. The Japanese have often been able to
capture a large share of the market in a relatively short time. In Japan, engineers were
permitted relatively free access to U.S. technologies through frequent conference attendances
and company visits during the 1950s and 1960s (Flamm 1996). By concentrating on
acquiring U.S. licenses and patents, Japanese firms soon were able to start low-cost mass
production by the late 1950s.
On China’s side, one of the major external barriers that hindered China from
developing an advanced semiconductor industry prior to the 2000s was U.S. exports controls
on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials (SEM). According to GAO
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(2002), under the Wassenaar Arrangement, SEMs were classified as dual-use technologies,
i.e., technologies that could be potentially used in both civil and military domains. Such is a
legacy of the Cold War, but the U.S. government was quite stringent in adhering to these
controls. It was said that the U.S. government generally ensured that the technology
transferred to China was at least two generations older than the state-of-the-art in the US
(GAO 2002).
III.2.6 Chinese Economic System after Reform
It should be noted that, beginning in 1978, the CCP, under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping, established a national objective of modernizing agriculture, industry, defense, and
science and technology. The objective of the second phase of reform (1984-1991) was to
improve resource allocation mechanisms. According to Chen (1995), the main focuses of the
reforms were (a) the material management system, (b) the foreign-trade management system,
and (c) the banking system. The third phase of reform (1992-present) has focused on the
macro-policy environment, including the reform of pricing, exchange rate and interest-rate
policies (Li 2011). After the reform, in the 2000’s, the open market structure conformed more
closely to the types of business structures that can generate innovation. In contrast to the
large state-owned enterprises before the 2000’s, founded and managed by expatriate technoentrepreneurs, enterprises after the 2000’s possibly had the most capable decision-makers
who were available in China.
In the 1987 enterprise reform, large enterprises were granted a number of rights to
operate with substantial autonomy outside the plan activities. They were allowed to hold
foreign trade rights, to decide the scope of sales, technology imports and upgrading, to
diversify production, to establish financial subsidiaries, and to raise funding. However, the
Chinese leaders had strong political considerations, which stressed the state’s primary
controlling ownership in the high-tech industries for the purpose of consolidating the socialist
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system, ensuring national security, supplying public goods, and adjusting economic structure
and leading economic growth.

III.3 Government Policy and Industrial Projects
Japan’s strategy towards the semiconductor industry has been characterized by active
government involvement in the industrial and technological upgrading. The Japanese state
played a crucial role both in manipulating the access of foreign competitors to the domestic
market and in restructuring the key domestic industries to promote their export
competitiveness. Intended to learn from Japanese strategy of building export competitiveness,
China launched the ‘grasping the large and releasing the small’ strategy, in order to build
state enterprises into vertically integrated and international competitive giant companies in
pillar industries.
In this section, we compare the similarity and difference between Chinese and Japanese
government policies and industrial projects.
III.3.1 China’s Market and Autonomy Reform
In the mid-1950s, China adopted a Stalinist-style centrally planned system that aimed
to substitute the administrative plan for competitive markets, and to abolish social inequality
by nationalizing production. Under this system, the state was responsible for all sectors and
decided all aspects of enterprises’ operations. But this situation changed dramatically with the
implementation of the development reorientation and opening up strategy in 1979. The
government began to get enterprises previously involved in the production of military goods
to convert to the production of civil goods. During the 1986-1992-reform period, China
started promoting four targeted circuits: integrated circuits, computers, telecommunications
equipment and software. Industrial policies were designed to extend enterprises’ autonomy
over management and administration, invest in R&D and education, and encourage
technology importation (FYP 1986-2004). However, enterprise and market-oriented reforms
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were carried out at a time when the bureaucratic economic apparatus remained dominant.
Macroeconomic imbalances frequently emerged.
Before the 2000’s, it was the lack of firms’ freedom to make decisions according to the
market information rather than the inefficiencies of the economic policies of the government
that resulted in the technological lag-behind in China. The state-owned and JV semiconductor
firms which dominated in China were firmly controlled by the state. Thus companies lacked
the autonomy in decision, resulting in little efficiency in decision making. The government
did not decentralize but instead concentrated power in the hands of Qili Hu, who was a
season party cadre, to oversee the Project 908 and 909, two large state-led projects intended
to upgrade the semiconductor technology in China. Hu made the largest ever investment in
semiconductors, while giving its Japanese partner authority over management decisions, in
exchange for an extended period of learning from the Japanese for the Chinese staff.
However, the disqualification of Chinese managers from exercising strategic control was
merely proving further evidences of the deficient capabilities of Chinese managers in 1990’s.
The state’s power was increasingly decentralized and transferred strategic control
gradually to the firms, during the process of China’s economic reform. Throughout the
1980’s and 1990s, the government made various experiments of corporate governance
regimes in state-owned firms in the hope of establishing a more efficient enterprise system. In
the 1980’s, the major effort was transferring responsibilities of decision-making to managers
through a Contract Management Responsibility System (Chen 1995). To overcome the
prevailing short-term behavior encouraged by CMRS, in the 1990’s the state established a
shareholding structure for large-sized SOEs and privatized the small- and middle-sized SOEs
in the name of “Modern Enterprise Management System” (Ibid).
As a result of the reform, the transformation of strategy, organization and social
conditions occurred and were translated into economic development, rise-up of the new
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enterprises and technological catch-up. Institutional changes, along with economic
transformation to a market-oriented economy, brought in the power of the market and started
to stimulate the dynamic function of the market system.
Yet, given the strategic importance of the semiconductor industry and its capitalintensive nature, the Chinese state continued to intervene in the corporate governance of the
state-owned semiconductor firms up until the end of the decade. The presence of Minister Hu
Qili at Huahong, a Chinese government’s backbone SOE, is the obvious evidence. But still,
the Chinese government was aware of the dire ability of the state in the centralized economy
to command each sector and so was ready to privatize the sector by transferring the power
from the state to the engineers and entrepreneurs, transforming to a more market-led
economy.
III.3.2 Japan and China’s Similar Big Business Strategy
Against a transforming economic background, China strived to learn from successful
countries’ strategies to promote the export competitiveness in the electronics industry. It is
interesting to find that China mimicked Japan’s strategy of domestic market protection and
national champions promotion.
To track back to Japanese history of development, Japan, as a “resource-poor nation”,
chose electronics industry for domestic development because it is a targeted industry that
Japan could serve to expand oversea sales. Unlike China that has abundant land and labor
resources, Japan initiated government policies that are intended to create comparative
advantage in high value-added industries as an alternative to remaining dependent on the
labor-intensive resources and capital. Thus it is due to this reason that led the Japanese state
to use government policies and trade policies to promote electronics industries, which would
grow Japan out of labor-intensive resources.
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Targeting this objective, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade Industry used a variety
of incentives and controls, including influence over financing, tax policies, import-export
measures and “administrative guidance” to induce Japanese firms to compete vigorous and
dynamically but at the same time to move in directions that are consistent with overall
national goals, targeting at a certain industries of increasing sophistication, taking advantage
of the demand pull from the consumer electronics and leveraging the close relationship
between government and business in Japan.
When Japan was at the beginning period of semiconductor industry development, the
Japanese market had relative weakness in computers and telecommunications. Japan also
lacked the military demand that had pushed U.S. semiconductor industry’s growth, meaning
that the domestic semiconductor industry’s development was not pulled toward innovation
except in consumer products. This situation posed a central dilemma for Japanese
policymakers. Under conditions of free trade and open market access, they faced the risk that
U.S. firms might dominate domestic Japanese markets in semiconductors, computers and
telecommunications. If they protected their markets and denied U.S. firms open access, they
risked severe technological backwardness in those sectors. The solution the policy makers
chose was characteristic of postwar Japanese development strategy. They used trade policy to
limit foreign penetration of the domestic market while deploying a range of financial and
promotional policies to assist the industry’s growth. In the role of controlling access, the
Japanese government has been characterized as an “official doorman” between domestic
Japan and the international arena, determining what, and under what conditions, capital,
technology and manufactured products enter and leave Japan (Pempel 1977). Selective
control over international foreign investment discouraged foreign efforts to control Japanese
firms and to manufacture in Japan. Imports were limited through tariff and nontariff barriers
to ensure that domestic firms would capture most the explosive growth in domestic demand.
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Technology imports were controlled by MITI in order to force foreign firms, whenever
possible, to sell technology. Thus “a closed market provided Japanese firms a stable base of
demand on which to build competitive productions and distribution network”. (Borrus et al
1981) Only after 1975, when Japanese firms had grown in their technological competence
and domestic market dominance, did the government begin to move toward a partial
dismantling the restrictions on foreign penetration. A more detailed discussion about Japan’s
trade policy will be mentioned in the next section.
Simultaneously, Japanese firms purchased huge amounts of foreign technology, mostly
from the United States, and used their strength in consumer products to subsidize a limited
price competition with U.S. firms in international semiconductor markets.
Japanese state played a crucial role both in manipulating the access of foreign
competitors to the domestic Japanese market and in restructuring the key domestic industries
to promote their export competitiveness. In contrast to Chinese government’s centralized
power in the state, Japanese state provided sufficient freedom the its private sectors but
instead promoted the market. What’s more, in addition to protecting the domestic industry,
the Japanese government encouraged domestic competition by supporting the expanding
firms. The state organized a stable availability of cheap capital; provided tax breaks to assure
cash flow liquidity, gave R&D support and helped to promote exports. Thus Japanese
encouragement of domestic competition eliminated the industrial losers and kept winners. As
a result, in most sectors, a few large vertically integrated firms emerged and carved up the
domestic market as a matter of company strategy and state policy. Markets were rationalized,
and in MITI’s words, “intra-industrial specialization” (MITI Policies) was encouraged as a
means of building efficient scale economies in market segments. Also, in Japan,
semiconductors were produced not by specialized semiconductor companies but by the
semiconductor divisions of large electronic systems companies. These companies – mainly
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manufacturers of communications equipment, computers and consumer electronics – had all
been producing semiconductor devices since soon after the invention of the transistor. Due to
this pattern, the semiconductor producers not only had access to low-cost capital but also
could take indirect advantage of tax incentives and other special benefits. Capacity expansion
was often planned with the state’s help. Thus vertical integration, “rationalization”,
“oligopolization” and “cartelization” were an integral part of the sectoral development policy
(Cupertino 1983). At one extreme lied the image of “Japan, Inc.,” in which at every level of
relations, businessmen and governmental promoters collaborate to further the development
and international competitiveness of Japanese business. At the other extreme, was “Japan, the
Land of Fierce Competition,” in which cutthroat competition was assumed to characterize
domestic Japanese markets (Borrus et al 1982).
On China’s side, China launched the ‘grasping the large and releasing the small’
strategy, intended to build state enterprises into vertically integrated and international
competitive giant companies in pillar industries, including the electronics sector. In 1984, the
central government reiterated that the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between enterprises
would be voluntary and horizontal and would preferably take the form of cooperation and
alliances between large and medium-sized SOEs in the form of joint-stock companies (JSCs).
In response to this central ‘blueprint’ and the enterprise autonomy reform, the
government announced a development strategy of ‘applying theories of economies of scale
and building China’s IBM, Hitachi, and Siemens’ in order to catch up with leading countries.
It was emphasized that enterprises should develop greater self-initiatives and ‘competitive
consciousness’ that could alter their attitude towards the new reform strategy from ‘I am
asked to integrate’ to ‘I want to integrate’ with other enterprises to improve performance (Li
T. 1986). Although enterprises were given decision making rights, they were treated as
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subdivision of local hierarchical bureaucracies and in practice were required to respond to the
command of governing authorities.
Moreover, China’s development strategies in the electronics sector were in fact inspired
by the Japanese models to support a team of national ICT group companies with a wide range
of statist industrial policies. Just like how MITI constructed import barriers, provided
subsidies for R&D and leveraged demand pull – Chinese government initiated policies such
as domestic market protection through tariff and non-tariff barriers; demand pull and supply
chain building through government procurement and local content requirements; financial
subsidies and incentives such as the purchase of production inputs on preferential terms, tax
relief, preferential loans from the state-owned banks. Tight control was imposed to main the
primary state ownership in the industry. And the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) was
set up in 1998, serving a similar role of MITI in Japan.
Thus the logic behind China’s adoption of a big business strategy in the semiconductor
industry at first sounds very reasonable. As historians and economists have observed, the
substantial level of economic growth in the eighteenth and eighteenth centuries was largely
due to technological progress, to which large industrial enterprises made a more significant
contribution than small-scale firms, and large firms were therefore the major driving force
behind economic development (Nolan 2001). Large firms are often the first mover in new
technologies or processes and the first to commercialize them into products and services.
Their financial position, derived from exploiting economies of scale, enables them to invest
heavily in R&D and compensate for the inherent market failure issues associated with high
technology and knowledge-intensive industries. Their ability to accumulate valuable human
resources ensures that they have a sustainable technological capacity to maintain innovative
activities (Chandler 1990).
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However, the performance of these Chinese large group companies was not as good as
expected. In 1997 the government announced that the total industrial sales, production output,
exports and value added of 12 targeted large firms accounted for roughly 10 percent of all
indicators of the total (Ning 2007). However, in 2004, fifteen targeted large firms accounted
only for 8 percent of total industrial output, 8 percent of the industrial sales, 1 percent of total
industrial profit, 6 percent of total exports, 9 percent of total value added and 12 percent of
the total industrial assets. (Information Technology Yearbook 2004; Ibid)
The problems in China of failing to replicate the same strategy are as follows. First of
all, China’s firm size strategy primarily targeted SOEs against the background of its gradual
market reform from the centrally planned economy, whereas the Japanese strategies focused
on private firms in economies that were market-oriented. Private firms in China expanded in
search of larger competitiveness but SOEs in China expanded their scales due to the
command of government. Second of all, the Japanese government encouraged domestic
competition by supporting the expanding firms. The state organized a stable availability of
cheap capital, provided tax breaks to assure cash flow liquidity, gave R&D support and
helped to promote exports. Japanese encouragement of domestic competition eliminated the
industrial losers and kept winners. Thus in Japan it was due to companies’ willingness to
increase competitiveness that they merged with other enterprises. However, in China,
enterprises were “forced” to take “voluntary” mergers with other enterprises. Some local
authorities whose definitions of large firms were unclear would merge large firms in their
region that had nothing in common – and these large firms would still be small-scale by
national standards. Such “forced” marriage only creates problems of corporate governance in
managing different firms.
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III.3.3 China’s Divergence from Japan’s Big Business Strategy
Adding to what has been discussed, in late 1980s, China proposed to pursue the small
and medium-sized business (SME) promotion strategy: “while promoting collectively the
large enterprises, we also need to develop a number of small, new, specialist small and
medium size companies in order to complement the development of the large firms” (Li T.
1986) However, this proposal was not implemented until 1990s after the problems of large
firms have been found in the Asian financial crisis while the Taiwan SME model succeeded
in weathering the crisis. Moreover, due to China’s entry to WTO, China minimized trade
tariffs and other interventional policies for protecting domestic markets and restricting
foreign investment. Thus in 2002, the central government promulgated the SME promotion
law by offering support in a number of areas including finance, business start-ups, technology
innovation and upgrading and market expansion.
Promoting the SMEs can increase degrees of competition and provide firms with
incentives to improve their technological capabilities and managerial abilities. In addition, the
SMEs can reduce the market power of local monopolies and allow a more efficient allocation
of resources. Moreover, small firms are regarded as having played an important role in longterm economic structural change where jobs move from one sector to another or new sector
after trade (Aghion and Blanchard 1993). Their flexible nature allows them to respond
quickly to market changes and become more diversified so to withstand the volatilities of
financial stocks (Wade 1998, 2004). During financial crisis in 1990s, it was just the lack of
SMEs that discouraged Japan from adjusting the structure. Moreover, Japan’s failure to
adjust to the newly emerged fables-foundry caused it to miss the opportunity of taking
advantage of the separation of supply chain and leveraging other countries’ labor-abundant
comparative advantages. On China’s side, China joined WTO and became integrated into the
world’s economy. Thus China started from material-based and labor-intensive industries and
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based its production on SMEs in order to fully exploit and reflect these two comparative
advantages.
III.3.4 Japan’s joint-efforts research capability and China’s failure with joint R&D
A very important project that pushed the great development of the Japanese
semiconductor industry was the VLSI project, a joint industry-government R&D effort. The
project was instituted to develop advanced semiconductor technologies, particular very largescale integrated circuits (VLSI). In the mid-1970s, MITI targeted the computer and
telecommunication markets as central to Japan’s future, aimed at increasing Japan’s
contribution to innovation in basic technologies, an area of technology that Japan
significantly lags behind in compared with the U.S. In mid and late 1975, MITI organized the
leading semiconductor firms into two government-supervised industrial groups (NECToshiba and Fujitsu-Hitachi-Mitsubishi) and fixed as the primary long-range goal the
development of Japan’s VLSI capability. It subsequently established an “executive plan” for
the semiconductor sector and budgeted amounts needed to implement the Plan. According to
MITI Machine and Information Industry Bureau, the Plan included 1) specific targets for
semiconductor research and development supported by government funding 2) specific
targets for semiconductor production, supported by government loans, and 3) specific targets
for “rationalization” of the Japanese semiconductor industry (MITI Machine and Information
Industry Bureau 1979)
The VLSI project was a “research cartel”: participating firms divided R&D tasks to
avoid duplicate efforts and pooled their results. The Project was jointly undertaken and
staffed by MITI and Nippon Telephone & Telegraph (NTT), and Japan’s five leading
semiconductor firms – NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi. A central laboratory
with about 100 personnel conducted fundamental research into semiconductor technology. Its
findings were turned over to two “applications” groups that developed marketable products
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from the basic research. The VLSI Project promoted extensive cross-fertilization of ideas
between and among Japanese firms and government scientists and at the same time, gave
each participating firm access to advanced technological know-how at a very low cost. As a
result, over 1000 new VLSI patents were developed, reflecting Japan’s goal of enabling
Japanese firms to pull abreast of U.S. firms technologically.
On china’s side, Chinese government concentrated on reducing semiconductor
producers’ costs because of lack of scale and fund in the semiconductor companies rather
than promoting R&D in basic technologies. Moreover, due to the inefficiency of government
decisions within the Chinese government, although the state and enterprises planed to
establish a collective research center, they had limited knowledge of the huge cost and
management models of such a research lab. Thus eventually China failed to establish a state’s
semiconductor research center (Yang 2005).
Furthermore, due to the lack of bureaucratic coherence, what happened in Chinese
semiconductor industry was that the subsidies provided for research in China was distributed
in too many sectors, instead of focusing on one specific technology and distributing the fund
to targeted companies. Some of the research firms that received subsidies were not even
capable of conducting commercial research of the semiconductor that cost over 1 million
dollars. Neither did China have the combined force of a group of companies in the research
and development like what Japan did in 1970s in developing its VSLI project. The Chinese
government’s subsidy for R&D was 80 million dollars in 2001-2004 and was distributed
among many firms. But in Japan, each group out of three paired groups formed by the six
semiconductor-computer firms received $200 million dollars between 1972 and 1976 (Borrus
et al 1982). The government-subsidies intended for research and development between two
countries differed largely.
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III.4 Trade Policy and Foreign Investment
While Japanese success in the semiconductor industry was credited to its government’s
protectionist policy in protecting the domestic market and encouraging the domestic market,
Chinese success in becoming one of the top semiconductor markets should be attributed to
China’s ‘walking out’ strategy, which was inseparable from the state effort in market reform
and trade liberalization.
III.4.1 Japan’s Protected Domestic Market and Import Displacement
Until 1974, the Japanese semiconductor market was officially closed. Japan maintained
quotas that were never sanctioned under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) on imports of semiconductors. Over a period of years, U.S. firms made repeated
efforts to penetrate the Japanese semiconductor market. With limited exceptions, these efforts
were not successful. MITI permitted some imports of U.S. semiconductors which its own
firms could not make and which its own end-products firms needed to remain competitive,
for example, ICs for pocket calculators and digital watches. Japanese firms also imported
U.S. semiconductor technology to enable Japan’s own semiconductor sector to grow.
Moreover, the government consistently rejected all applications for wholly owned
subsidiaries and for joint ventures in which foreign firms would hold majority ownership. It
also restricted foreign purchases of equity in Japanese semiconductor firms. Simultaneously,
the government limited foreign import penetration of the home market through high tariffs
and restrictive quotas and approval-registration requirements on advanced IC devices in
particular. The price to US firms for limited access to the Japanese market was—similarly to
Chinese case before 2000—their licensing of advanced technology and know-how. This too
was regulated closely by the Japanese government, whose approval was required on all patent
and technical-assistance licensing agreements.
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Japan’s general policy was simple and effective. It required foreign firms to license all
Japanese firms requesting access to a particular technology. In line with the characteristics
emphasis on export strategy, MITI often linked the import of particular technologies to the
acquiring firm’s ability to develop export products using that technology. The total result of
these policies was a controlled diffusion of advanced technology throughout the Japanese
semiconductor industry. Moreover, prior to 1975, formal quotas and prior-approval
requirements restricted imports of semiconductors into Japan was so strictly regulated as to
be essentially forbidden. The effect of such a quota on the exporting country is demonstrated
as follows.
Suppose for simplicity that there are only two trading countries, one importing, Japan
and one exporting, the U.S., as indicated in Figure 3.7. According to “Import Quota”, which
explains the international trade theory, the supply and demand curves for the two countries
are shown in the adjoining diagram. PFT is the free trade equilibrium price. At that price, the
excess demand by the importing country equals excess supply by the exporter.
Figure 3.7 Models of Effects of Quota on Importing and Exporting Country

Source: "Import Quota." UNIPV. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Apr. 2012.
<http://economia.unipv.it/pagp/pagine_personali/msassi/readinglist/doc2.pdf>.
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In the case between Japan and US, the horizontal distance between the supply and
demand curves at the free trade price is Japan’s import from US during free trade.
International trade theory tells us that - as “Import Quota” so indicates - that when an
importing quota is set equal to the length of the red line (the horizontal distance between the
supply and demand curve at the PIM of the importing country), the price of the importing
country goes up to PIMQ in the importing country and the price of the exporting country
receives goes down to PEXQ. Thus when a new equilibrium is reached the price in the
importing country will rise to the level at which import demand (DIM-SIM) is equal to the
quota level. The price in the exporting country will fall until export supply (SEX-DEX) is equal
to the quota level. Thus the outcome of price effect on both the importing country and the
exporting country is enormous: when Japan sets a quota on the semiconductor industry, it not
only raises the importing prices of the semiconductors imported from foreign countries
(mainly from U.S.) but also reduces the exporting prices U.S. firms will receive. A great
percentage of U.S. firms’ price competitiveness and profitability are lost due to the quota. As
a result, the import and export amount shrink from the length of blue line (which indicates the
amount of import and export during free-trade) to that of red line (which indicates the amount
of import and export under quote control).
Historically, in response to Japan’s protectionist policy, American chip producers urged
that Washington initiated market access negotiations with the Japanese government. Early
industry pressure forced the Japanese to enter into negotiations with the United States in
1982. This early set of talks produced an agreement in which the Japanese government
committed itself to using its authority to prevent dumping, providing U.S. with greater access
to Japanese patents, refraining from copying U.S. propriety circuits, and encouraging
Japanese to increase purchases of U.S. semiconductor products through administrative
guidance. Throughout 1983, the semiconductor industry released numerous reports and
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studies with detailed accounts of the unfair trade practices pursued by Japanese chipmakers
and the Japanese government.
But interestingly, even years after “liberalization”, U.S. semiconductor firms did not
hold a larger share of the retail merchant market than they held when imports were controlled
by the quotas. An important factor in the inability of U.S. firms to penetrate the Japanese
market was the simple fact that the same firms that produced most of Japan’s integrated
circuit also accounted for a majority of Japan’s semiconductor consumption. Moreover, Japan
had the skill to displace imports – due to Japan’s ‘buy Japan’ strategy - from the U.S. so that
even after the “liberalization” U.S. still could not penetrate the Japanese market. U.S.
companies were able to achieve some penetration of the Japanese market with a particular
product so long as sufficient quantities of a competing Japanese product were not available,
but as soon as Japanese firms could supply the product in sufficient volume, U.S. firms’ sales
dropped sharply, sometimes almost to zero.
However Due to Japanese protected domestic market strategy, many companies chose
merger and acquisition in order to create individual enterprise’s competitiveness by becoming
a large-size company. The consequence of Japanese semiconductor’s frequent merger was
that these producers’ scales were so large that it took longer time for Japanese large-scale
semiconductor firms to restructure.
Furthermore, due to the closeness of the market, the lack of foreign investment caused
their inertia to spot the global trend shift and make changes accordingly. For many years,
Japanese firms were responsible for both design and product and are increasing investment in
R&D in the production technology in order to increase the product competitiveness. Since
the rise of the pure-play business models, fabless (fabrication-less) semiconductor company
has been specialized in the design and sale of hardware devices and semiconductor chips
while outsourcing the fabrication or “fab” of the devices to a specialized manufacturer called
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a semiconductor foundry. The U.S. semiconductor firms adjusted to the model very quickly
and started to outsource chip manufacturing to foundry such as TSMC in Taiwan and SMIC
in China. The results of such collaboration between horizontally divided organizations
overwhelmed Japanese integrated device manufacturers. Thus the business environment for
vertically integrated Japanese device manufacturers worsened as the semiconductor industry
came to be based on a flatter and horizontally divided structure.
China, on the other hand, established many foundries in the form of a mixed ownership,
invested by foreign companies, thanks to China’s ‘attracting in and walking out’ strategy.
After liberalization in the 2000’s, the Chinese semiconductor firms came to collaborate with
U.S. companies to provide fabrication-outsourcing services. Leveraging China’s comparative
advantage and conforming to the liberalized open trade in the global market, China’s export
to the U.S. continued to grow at an average around 30 percent.
III.4.2 China’s ‘Attracting in and Walking Out’ Strategy
In the beginning of the Chinese development history of the semiconductor industry, the
Chinese market had been a closed one with tariffs and regulated foreign direct investment.
However, along with Chinese economic transformation, after 2000’s, China gradually
reduced its tariffs and opened its economy for trade and foreign investment.
According to Li (2010), throughout 1990s, the domestic semiconductor market of
China remained a protected one. Tariffs on semiconductors varied from 6 to 30 percent, and
foreign direct investments were highly regulated (Dewey Ballantine, 2003). Very few
multinationals were able to establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) during this
time. Major multinational chip producers, including Alcatel, Lucent, Philips, and NEC,
entered China in the form of joint ventures, subject to conditions such as transferring
technologies and guaranteed purchases of outputs. China restricted market access in order to
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regulate the large entry of foreign competitors unless foreign companies agree to transfer
technologies or purchase outputs produced domestically in China.
However, Jiang Zeming (the former MEI minister) recognized that this highly
controlled trade and investment regime prevented the electronics industry from gaining from
technology spillover effects and forming the start-up basis for production. He argued that
capital- and technology-intensive industries such as the electronics industry could not be
established on the basis of developing countries’ own capabilities. Countries such as Brazil
and India, which focused on across-the-board import substitution, experienced many
difficulties in increasing their foreign reserves. Their capabilities were too weak to develop
new products and they had to import costly technologies and equipment for production.
Conversely, the East Asian ‘tigers’ had switched to an export-oriented strategy and achieved
great access. During his term of office at the MEI, he launched a set of more liberal trade and
investment policies, namely the ‘attracting in and ‘walking out’ strategies, based on Deng’s
‘open door’ policy at the national level.
Jiang believed that the selective introduction of FDI to develop this sector was
particularly helpful to alter China’s industrial production structure towards export-oriented
labor-intensive industries. Jiang proposed to step into the international electronics market
through carrying out assembling and OEM activities for foreign firms (Jiang 1993; Li 1993).
In the 1980s, the government began to introduce ‘special economic zones’ in order to provide
market export-oriented institutions and preferential policies outside the plan system to attract
and support FDI activities. After Deng had pushed forward a renewed reform agenda in 1992,
special provisions and more liberal policies were made much more widely available for FDI
including tax and tariff concession and relaxation on business era. In 2001, when China was
preparing for admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO), China became a
signatory of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which required reducing tariffs
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on all ITA products, including semiconductors, to zero. To comply with WTO rules, China
had to make large-scale legal amendments in line with those in other WTO countries. In June
2000, the State Council issued a semiconductor industry policy document that would be the
most influential for the next decade: “Policies on encouraging the development of software
and integrated circuit industry” (Circular 18). According to China’s Tenth Five Year Plan
(FYP 2001-2005), Circular 18 restated the state’s ambition to develop a world-class
semiconductor industry, but promoted a very different means to achieve this goal. The major
policies in Circular 18 can be summarized as the following:
1) Tax break. Eligible IC manufacturers (investment exceeding 8 billion RMB and linewidth smaller than 0.25-micron) can receive a five-year tax holiday from corporate income
tax starting from the first profit year. The tax rate would then be halved for an additional five
years. (FYP 2001-2005)
2) Value-Added Tax (VAT) and import duty exemptions on imported raw materials,
equipment and machinery. VAT rebates for domestically produced ICs. Designers and
producers can qualify for up to a 14 percent VAT rebate for domestically produced chips. In
another words, a 17 percent tax is imposed on imported semiconductors while only 3 percent
is charged for those produced domestically. (Asian Wall Street Journal 2004)
3) Infrastructure investment. Direct budgetary funds shall be allocated to provide
financial support for construction of infrastructure (usually by local governments) (FYP
2001-2005)
4) Foreign currency retention. “To evade the exchange rate risk, [IC manufacturers] are
allowed to deposit the after-tax profits in the special accounts in the form of The VAT rebate
policy later became controversial among foreign investors and their government. In March
2004, the US government complained to the WTO that China was violating trade rules by
using tax to discriminate against oversea producers. As a result China withdrew the VAT
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rebate in April 2005 foreign currency if the profits are to be used for reinvestment in China.”
(Ibid)
6) Capital provision. The state provides assistance in the form of favored status and
financial support to the establishment of venture capital firms. (Ibid)
7) National treatment of foreigners. The policies are applied to both foreign and
domestically owned firms that qualify (article 52).
8)Training programs. Universities are encouraged to provide courses and degrees on
electronic engineering through increased budget allocations on the basis of increased
enrollments (FYP 2001-2005)
These policies were major departures from the industrial support of the 1990s, which
emphasized government involvement in industry coordination, leveraging the huge Chinese
market for technology transfer, and using the domestic market to create national champions
that could compete globally. Instead, Circular 18 promoted industrial development through
deregulation, subsidies, tax incentives, FDI liberalization, investment in infrastructure, and
science, education and training programs. The old tools used to promote infant industries,
such as market access restriction, tariff protection and technology transfer requirements, had
to be largely abandoned. Circular 18 reflected an attempt by China’s industrial promoters to
experiment with new policy tools, given China’s new need to play be a new set of rules in
global competition. It seemed that China changed to play the game of market-based incentive
policies.
The changes in developmental strategies starting from Circular 18 had an enormous
impact on the semiconductor industry. First of all, instead of focusing on the state-led
projects, new policies now promoted the growth of all players, regardless of indigenous or
foreign, state-owned or non-government. It was under such an industrial conditions change
that the foundries, which required a huge fixed investment, often having their capital costs
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shouldered by a combination of foreign venture capital firms, domestic banks and the
Chinese government, rose in the Chinese market and pumped up the semiconductor industry.
Secondly, circular 18 provided encouragement of foreign investment to a large degree.
The old players in the semiconductor sector that entered prior to 2000 were mostly owned in
the form of SOE-JV (state-owned enterprise and joint venture). New entrants often had a
“mixed” ownership structure, meaning shares were distributed among a variety of foreign and
domestic entities. The entrepreneurial teams were more likely to excise managerial control
with the absence of dominant shareholders such as the state. Even the old state-owned firms
that used to be controlled by bureaucrat-turned managers assigned by the state saw changes
in management.
Thirdly, Circular 18 specifically pointed to semiconductor industry as exempted from
17 percent VAT on the imported machinery and raw materials are eternally eliminated –
further added up to the incentives provided by the tax break – allowed firms to grasp this
opportunity to import the latest technology from the advanced countries with exemption from
the import tariff. Moreover, according to the third government policy, where a major VAT
cut to 3 percent is imposed on domestically produced semiconductor while 17 percent VAT
on imported semiconductors, firms were strongly encouraged to develop the production of
semiconductors indigenously rather than importing the semiconductors from abroad and
taking charge of merely assembling.
Here the Chinese government made use of the idea of subsidy in order to encourage the
development of the semiconductor industry by providing incentives to the business managers
of these companies. A subsidy is an assistance paid to a business or economic sector. Most
subsidies are made by the government to producers or distributed as subventions in an
industry to prevent the decline of that industry or an increase in the prices of its products or
simply to encourage it to hire more labor. Examples are subsidies to encourage the sale of
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exports; subsidies on some foods to keep down the cost of living, and subsidies to encourage
the expansion of some industry production.
Figure 3.5 shows a simplistic graphical explanation of the effect of a subsidy on the
industry. When semiconductor companies are qualified for a specific tax cut (thus lowering
the production cost), they will increase the domestic supply, shifting the supply curve of the
firm towards the right. The same theory applies to the semiconductor industry: if the whole
industry is qualified for a tax cut as long as the companies in the industry produce
semiconductors domestically, the supply curve of the entire industry shifts to the right – more
semiconductor companies rise while the demand curve remains – driving the domestic price
of the semiconductor down. The result is that if in a closed market, the price of the
semiconductor will go down.
Figure 3.5 Supply and Demand Model with Subsidy

Source: drawn by the author
To consider the impact of a domestic subsidy policy in the semiconductor industry in
the international market, we depict this equilibrium diagram in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.6
supposes for simplicity that only the importing country’s (in this case, China’s) supply and
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demand are shown. We assume that the Chinese semiconductor market relies largely on
imports from foreign countries and domestic production will not affect the supply curve.
According to the international trade theory, explained in “Production Subsidy Effects in a
Small Importing Country”, the original price is given by PFT, a price determined by the global
semiconductor market. The domestic supply is S1, and domestic demand is D1, which
determines imports in free trade as D1-S1 (the length of the red line). When a production
subsidy is imposed, the domestic producer price rises by the subsidy value to Pp. If we
assume in this case that China did not have any other trade barriers and China’s
semiconductor production in the beginning of 2000 was still weak thus not able to influence
the global semiconductor market’s price. Thus the effect of China’s subsidy on the
semiconductor would be categorized as a domestic production subsidy in a small importing
country. As a result of the subsidy, the domestic consumer price remains at PFT; but the prices
domestic producers would receive would go up to Pp. The effect of the subsidy in this case
would raise domestic supply from S1 to S2, while domestic demand would remain at D1.
Imports from other countries, would fall from (D1-S1) to (D1-S2).
Figure 3.6 A Domestic Production Subsidy in a Small Importing Country

Source: "Production Subsidy Effects in a Small Importing Country." PEOI. N.p., n.d.
Web. 25 Apr. 2012. <http://www.peoi.org/Courses/Coursesen/intrade/ch/ch9d.html>.
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Note: assuming China’s semiconductor production in the beginning of 2000’s in is small
If that is the case, the domestic consumers are unaffected by the subsidy since the
domestic consumer price remains the same. The subsidy will cause the price producers
receive to go up to PP, which in turn stimulates an increase in output from S1 to S2. Foreign
prices will remain unchanged, and although their exports to this country will fall, these
changes in trade volumes will be too small to be noticed in the rest of the world.
Figure 3.7 A Domestic Production Subsidy in a Large Importing Country

Source: "Monopoly and Monopsony Power and Trade." PEOI. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Apr.
2012. <http://www.peoi.org/Courses/Coursesen/intrade/temp/ch10g.html>.
Note: assuming China’s semiconductor production in the beginning of 2000’s is largely
influenced by the subsidy and the increase of production is large enough to affect the global
market price.
On the other hand, if China’s subsidy would largely influence Chinese semiconductor
companies’ production amount—that is—sufficient enough to influence the price in the
global semiconductor market, it would become another case, which is shown in Figure 3.7.
According to “Monopoly and Monopsony Power and Trade”, when a specific production
subsidy is imposed, the producer's price rises, at first by the value of the subsidy. The
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consumer's price is initially unaffected. This increase in the producer's price induces the
producer to increase its supply to the market. The supply rises along the supply curve and
imports begin to fall. However, because the country is a large importer, the decrease in
imports represents a decrease in the world demand for the product. As a result, the world
price of the good falls, which in turn means that the price paid by consumers in the import
market also falls. When a new equilibrium is reached, the producer's price will have risen to
Pp, the consumer's price will have fallen Pw, and the difference between the producer and
consumer prices will be equal to the value of the specific subsidy. Note that the production
subsidy causes an increase in supply from S1 to S2 and an increase in demand from D1 to D2.
Because both supply and demand rise, the effect of the subsidy on imports is, in general,
ambiguous.
Table 3.3 US electronics and information industry trade with China and Japan, 19972005

Note semiconductors account for a significant share of electronics and information industry
trade
Source: USITC Dataweb, 2006
In reality, what happens between China and US in the semiconductor market was that
both US exports to China and imports from China increased, according to Table 3.3.
Moreover, it should be noted that from 2001 to 2005, U.S. imports from China was five times
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US exports to China. China’s semiconductor export rose dramatically from 2001 to 2005
while US export rose too. Thus China’s subsidy should be categorized as the second case,
demonstrated in Figure 3.7 where a domestic production subsidy will largely influence the
international semiconductor market supply. Therefore, China’s case not only raised Chinese
exports but also expanded China’s imports from other country.
However, US government alleged that China provided preferential tax treatment for
domestic semiconductor producers and that the preferences violated China’s national
treatment obligation (Institute for International Economics). Through bilateral negotiations,
China agreed to eliminate VAT refunds for any new semiconductor products or
manufacturers and to phase out semiconductor rebates in 2005. America argued this was
unfair to American semiconductor producers, but in this case, the increase of the supply in
china would drive down the semiconductor prices in the international market and would in
fact more import demand for the semiconductors from US. The loss of subsidy on the
domestic semiconductor producer might drive up the prices of the semiconductor in the
global market again, reducing the import demand from the US. The decrease of US exports to
China and Japan in 2005 could be a consequences caused by the increase of semiconductors’
prices.
Nevertheless, the implementation of a more liberal ‘attracting in’ policy led China to a
sharp rise in FDI, which has become the industry’s main investment source and reduced
pressure on the tight state budget since the mid 1990s (Harrold and Lall 1993; Lardy 2001).
With the rising of fabless-foundry model, by 2000, China had emerged as an attractive
location for new fab investment in terms of cost advantages. During 2003-2005, China
remained the world’s third largest ICT producer (semiconductors account for a significant
share of electronics and information industry trade), which, with an increase in industrial
output from US $14.7 billion to US $20.1 billion (Information Technology Yearbook 1986	
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2006). China has been closing the gap between its world output share and that of Japan, the
world’s second largest ICT producer, from 2.1 percent to 0.6 percent and the gap with that of
the United States, the largest, from 12.4 percent to 5.5 percent (Ibid).
III.4.3 Chinese and Japanese Trade Policy Compared
In summary, comparing Chinese and Japanese trade policy, both countries were alleged
“unfair” protectionist by the U.S. and the western world and thus headed toward
liberalization. What is different is that the Chinese economy transformed from a close
economy to an open one with policies to encourage foreign investment and open trade in
order to absorb technology and knowledge from the western world while Japan adopted the
strategy of protectionist trade policy in order to gain technology transfer and competitiveness.
In the beginning of Chinese development history of the semiconductor industry,
Chinese market was a closed one with tariffs and regulated foreign direct investment.
However, along with Chinese economic transformation, after the 2000’s, China gradually
reduced its tariffs and opened its economy for trade and foreign investment. But Japan, on the
other hand, did not liberalize until Japan had obtained significant results in the basic
technology development in the industry. Before liberalization, Japanese government
consistently rejected all applications for wholly owned subsidiaries and for joint ventures in
which foreign firms would hold majority ownership. Formal quotas and prior-approval
requirements restricted imports of semiconductors into Japan. The requirement was so strict
that the imports were nearly forbidden in Japan.
An essential difference between China and Japan lies at that Chinese strategy focused
on providing incentives to domestic semiconductor producer by providing subsidies and
preferential tax incentives, which should be defined as domestic production subsidy rather
than a trade-oriented subsidy while Japan imposed strict trade restriction tools. Moreover, the
result of the Chinese subsidies was not necessarily reducing imports because the increase of
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Chinese semiconductor production would in fact lower the price in the global market and
consequently raise the import demand from the U.S. On the other hand, Japan’s strategy
focused on the international trade policy to create a closed Japanese market protected from
foreign competitions, thus providing more incentives for domestic firms to conduct R&D.
Preventing foreign competitions while encouraging internal competitions, MITI intended to
establish “buy Japan” attitude” in addition to create technological catch-up.
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IV Conclusion and Future Directions

In conclusion, China and Japan’s paths of development in the semiconductor industry
are unalike, due to two countries’ historical, economic and natural differences. Historically
speaking, the political turmoil in China in 1960s largely disturbed China’s technological
development. When China found itself lagging behind on the technological ground in the
1970’s, China’s semiconductor technology was already ten years behind Japan’s. In terms of
the economic systems, a major divergence between China and Japan is that China went
through an economic transformation from a command economy to a market-oriented
economy; Japan, on the other hand, has always been a market-oriented economy. Finally, in
terms of natural resources, China is a labor-abundant country while Japan is a “resourcepoor” country.
As a result of these environmental differences, Japan’s development strategy targeted a
knowledge- and capital- intensive industry (semiconductor industry, in this case) by
providing preferential assistances while deliberately keeping that market protected from
foreign competitions to ensure that the industry had a high volume and a profitable base.
When the Japanese achieved the economy of scale and cost competitiveness and gained
enough production experiences, Japan expanded the market share by aggressive pricing and
ultimately dominated the foreign market. On the other hand, China’s development strategy
went from a protectionist strategy in a command economy—learning from the Japanese
model—which focused on cultivating large state-owned enterprises to be national champions
and protecting the market from foreign competition, to an export-oriented strategy in a
relatively more market-oriented economy which encouraged foreign investment and
leveraged China’s comparative advantage by cooperating with foreign firms.
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To answer the question I raised in the beginning of this study—why China is bearing an
impression of assembly center and Japan having a proving ground of technological
advance—the concept of comparative advantage from Heckscher-Olin theorem explains
Chinese and Japanese firms’ respective positions in the global semiconductor market. As a
labor-abundant country, China serves the roles of packaging and assembling final products,
which require labor. Unfortunately, labor-intensive sectors usually contain low added value,
and thus this is the reason why China has an impression of being an assembly center.
Japan, on the other hand, is a “poor-resource” country and thus strives to develop
capital- and knowledge-intensive industries via protectionist strategies. In order to achieve
this objective, Japan’s MITI encouraged domestic competition, provided assistance and
ensured freedom in the private sector while manipulating the foreign competition. Firms were
encouraged to build efficient scale economies in market segments. Meanwhile, Japan
benefited from being the U.S.’ strategic ally and took a free ride on U.S. technologies.
Subsequently, a few large vertically integrated firms emerged and carved up the domestic
market. Japan is thus specialized in application technology and production technology with
higher value-added.
But is Japan’s development path necessarily better than China’s path? Looking at Japan
and China’s current status in the semiconductor market, we see that the rising Chinese
companies increasingly outperform Japanese semiconductor companies and moreover the
U.S. is regaining its cost competitiveness by outsourcing production to the labor-intensive
countries. I believe that the origin of this phenomenon is Japan’s protectionist strategy and
China’s ‘walking out’ strategy.
In the beginning of Chinese development history of the semiconductor industry, the
Chinese market was a closed one with tariffs and regulated foreign direct investment.
However, along with the Chinese economic transformation, after the 2000’s, China gradually
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reduced its tariffs and opened its economy for trade and foreign investment. But Japan, on the
other hand, in order to develop a capital- and knowledge-intensive industry, adopted the
protectionist policy towards trade by imposing import tariffs and restricting foreign
investment. Meanwhile, Japan promoted domestic competitions by cultivating large-size
national champions. As a result, many companies chose merger and acquisition in order to
create individual enterprise’s competitiveness by becoming a large-scale company. The
consequence of Japanese semiconductor’s frequent mergers was that these producers’ scales
were so large that it took longer time for the Japanese large-scale semiconductor firms to
restructure and adjust to the changes, especially during financial crises. Furthermore, due to
the closeness of the Japanese market, the lack of foreign investment caused Japanese firms to
be slow to spot the global trend shift. It was hard for Japanese firms to make changes
accordingly. One proof is Japanese firms’ failure to adjust to the newly emerged fablesfoundry model. Japanese firms have adopted the form of IDM for many years, responsible for
both design and manufacturing. Since Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
(TSMC) invented the pure-play business model, the semiconductor industry has become a
segment of increasingly vertical specialization. Fabless (fabrication-less) semiconductor
companies specialize in the design and sale of semiconductor chips while outsourcing the
fabrication or “fab” of the devices to a specialized manufacturer called a semiconductor
foundry. Foundries are typically located in countries with lower cost labor so that fabless
companies can benefit from lower costs while concentrating their research and development
resources on the end market. But Japanese firms were so large-scale that it was difficult for
them to adapt their business models to the newly emerged fabless-foundry model. In response
to this change, U.S. semiconductor firms, however, adjusted to the model very quickly and
regained competitiveness by outsourcing chip manufacturing to the foundries in laborintensive countries such as TSMC and SMIC in China. Thus, the business environment for
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vertically integrated Japanese device manufacturers worsened as the semiconductor industry
came to be based on a flatter and horizontally divided structure.
China, on the other hand, established many foundries, which are invested by foreign
companies. The rise of the foundries in China is due to China’s “walking out” strategy. After
the liberalization in the 2000’s, Chinese semiconductor firms came to collaborate with U.S.
firms to provide fabrication-outsourcing services. Leveraging China’s comparative advantage
and conforming to the liberalized open trade in the global market, China’s export to US
continued to grow at an average around 30 percent. From 2003 to 2008, domestic Chinese
semiconductor manufacturers, not foreign firms, accounted for over 80 percent of China’s
annual productions (McClean, et al 2009). During this time, China’s world-class
semiconductor enterprise, Semiconductor Manufacturing International (SMIC) and Grace
Semiconductor Manufacturing (GSMC) emerged as a foundry startup. Both foundries raised
over one billion USD investments from foreign venture capital, domestic banks and
government entities to construct their state-of-the-art fabs, starting from 200mm, 0.25- to
0.18-micron process. SMIC became successful, owing to a mixture of technological
expertise, international market access, deep-pocketed investors and an aggressive expansion
strategy (Li 2011). Since 2004, SIMC has remained among the top five foundries globally.
And it was during the 2000’s that China experienced its largest wave of entry into the
semiconductor industry and had its largest historical growth.

IV.1 Future Directions
Overall, this study compares Japanese and Chinese development paths in the
semiconductor and finds an explanation of how Japan and China’s semiconductor industries
came to their current status in the global market. However, many other directions remain to
be discussed. For example, are protectionist policies - as what Japan implemented - only
short strategies? Is liberalization a better path for a country’s economy? How should China
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upgrade its technologies and how should China conduct R&D in order to move towards a
global position with high value-added?
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